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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW WRITING
COMPETITION WINNER
ASSEMBLY BILL 2222: CALIFORNIA PUSHES AND
BREAKS THE DISABILITY LAW ENVELOPE
Michael L. Murphy'
In 1973, California enacted legislation prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of physical handicap, except in cases where the person is unable
to perform the duties of the job in question.' The legislation defined
"physical handicap" as an "impairment of sight, hearing, or speech, or
impairment of physical ability because of amputation or loss of function
or coordination, or any other health impairment which requires special
education or related services."'2 In 1980, the California Legislature
recodified its housing and employment laws to enact the Fair
Employment and Housing Act (FEHA).3 The current FEHA, which
* J.D. Candidate, May 2002, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
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2001-02. Mr. Murphy wishes to thank Professors Elaine Gardner and Roger Hartley,
Michael McGuinness, Esq., O'Melveny & Myers LLP, Douglas Dexter, Esq., O'Melveny
& Myers LLP, David D. Kadue, Esq., Seyfarth Shaw, Joan E. Smiles, Esq., Sidley Austin
Brown & Wood LLP, Raymond L. Wheeler, Esq., Morrison & Foerster LLP, and
particularly the editorial board and staff of The Catholic University Law Review for their
insights and encouragement.
1. Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, 5 Cal. 4th 1050, 1056 & n.5 (Cal. 1993) (citations
omitted); see also Marjorie Gelb & JoAnne Frankfurt, California's Fair Employment and
Housing Act: A Viable State Remedy for Employment Discrimination, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
1055, 1059 (1983); infra Part 1.A.
2. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1056 (citation omitted).
3. The Fair Employment & Housing Act is codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,900-
12,996 (West 1992). Enacted in 1980, FEHA consists of the following:
Chapter 1 - establishes the Department of Fair Employment & Housing;
Chapter 3 - identifies the public policy of the State of California as forbidding
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, religion, color, national
origin, ancestry, physical disability, mental disability, medical condition, marital
status, sex, or age;
Chapter 4 - contains definitions for terms within the Act;
Chapter 5 - identifies the powers and duties of the Department and the
Commission;
Chapter 6 - describes the types of employment discrimination that are deemed
unlawful employment practices;
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covers all employers with five or more employees,4  prohibits
discrimination in all aspects of employment including hiring, termination,
and terms and conditions. 5 The FEHA is similar to the federal civil
rights laws, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,6 the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act,7 the American with Disabilities Act
(ADA),8 and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).9
The FEHA's disability discrimination provisions have undergone a
major expansion. Enacted on January 1, 2001, Assembly Bill 2222 (AB
2222),'o popularly known as the Prudence K. Poppink Act," amended the
FEHA12 and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. 3 Consequently, the disability
Chapter 7 - outlines the enforcement and hearing procedures; and
Chapter 8 - describes the nondiscrimination and compliance employment
programs.
http://www.randlaw.comlfeha.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2001).
4. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926(c) (West 1992). FEHA defines an "employer" as:
[Alny person or individual in any business or enterprise regularly employing five
or more individuals . . . . "Employer" includes the State of California, any
political or civil subdivision thereof, counties, cities, city and county, local
agencies, or special districts, irrespective of whether that entity employs five or
more individuals. A religious association or religious corporation not organized
for private profit is not an employer under the meaning of this Act.
CAL. CODE REGS tit. 2, § 7286.5 (2001). For employment discrimination purposes based
on harassment, "'employer' means any person regularly employing one or more persons..
* ." CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,940(h) (West 1992). For employment discrimination based on
mental disability, "employer" means any person regularly employing fifteen or more
persons. Id. §§ 12,926(d)(2), 12,940(l)(2). See Review of Selected 1.992 California
Legislation, 24 PAC. L.J. 593, 906-07 & nn. 22-25 (1992).
5. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,940 (West 1992).
6. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1)-(17) (1995).
7. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (1978) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)).
8. Americans with Disabilities Act, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1995)).
9. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1995)).
10. AB 2222 was introduced by Assembly Member Sheila Kuehl on February 24,
2000. Complete Bill History, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_2201-
2250/ab_2222_bill_20000930_history.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2001). It was amended
several times before its passage on August 29, 2000, in the Senate, and August 31, 2000, in
the Assembly. Id. The Bill was signed by Governor Davis on September 30, 2000, and
filed with the Secretary of State the same day. Id.
11. Prudence K. Poppink was a former hearing officer and commission counsel with
the California Fair Employment and Housing Commission. As a result of her
distinguished career, California Assemblywoman Sheila Kuehl named AB 2222 in her
honor. http://www.callaw.comstories/edtll20d.shtml (last visited Mar. 16, 2001).
12. CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12,900-12,996 (West 1992). This law prohibits harassment
or discrimination in all aspects of employment on the basis of: age (forty and over),
ancestry, color, creed, denial of family and medical care leave, disability (mental and
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law landscape in California has changed significantly. The language of
AB 2222 distinguishes it from federal disability law by stating:
The law of this state in the area of disabilities provides
protections independent from those in the federal Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-336). Although
the federal act provides a floor of protection, this state's law has
always, even prior to the passage of the federal act, afforded
additional protections. 4
By changing four basic areas of disability law, California has effectively
distinguished itself from its federal counterpart. First, AB 2222 broadens
the definition of "disability" to apply to "laws prohibiting discrimination
in public accommodations, business transactions, access to public places,
and employment in the state civil service system."'5 Second, it creates an
affirmative duty for employers to engage in an interactive process to
assess, in conjunction with the employee requesting the accommodation,
the possibility and effectiveness of any potential accommodation.
1 6
Third, it prohibits employers from requiring medical or physical
examinations of either applicants or employees, unless the exam is given
after an employment offer is made and the exam is job related and
consistent with business necessity. 7 Fourth, AB 2222 protects individuals
from discrimination on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or
physical), including HIV and AIDS, marital status, medical condition (cancer and genetic
characteristics), national origin, race, religion, sex, and sexual orientation. Fair
Employment and History Act, http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/feha.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001);
Prohibited Employment Practices, http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/proEmp.htm (last visited Nov.
2,2001).
13. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1982). This act "provides protection from
discrimination by all business establishments in California, including housing and public
accommodations, because of: [a]ge; [a]ncestry; [color; [d]isability; [n]ational [o]rigin;
[r]ace; [r]eligion; and [s]ex." http://www.dfeh.ca.gov/unruh.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2001).
14. AB 2222, § 6(a), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12,926.1(a)) (emphasis added).
15. Id. §§ 2-4 (codified at CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 51, 51.5, 54).
16. Id. § 6(e) (codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926.1(e)). The circuits are split on
whether the ADA requires an employer to engage in an interactive process with the
employee when discussing reasonable accommodations. In Rehling v. City of Chicago, 207
F.3d 1009,1016 (7th Cir. 2000), the court determined that an employer's failure to engage
in an interactive process was not a violation of the ADA. However, in Barnett v. U.S. Air,
Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted in part, 532 U.S. 970 (2001), the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the ADA requires an employer to engage in the interactive process.
Id. at 1116. Also, in Cravens v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, 214 F.3d 1011
(8th Cir. 2000), the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff may proceed with an ADA claim
when the employer's role in the interactive process is questionable. Id. at 1021.
17. AB 2222, § 7(e)(3), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 12,940(e)).
2002]
Catholic University Law Review
mental disability, including potentially disabling conditions or ones
perceived as such."
Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,'9 which is the
federal analog to the employment disabilities portion of the FEHA, also
prohibits discrimination against individuals with mental or physical
disabilities.20 An individual qualifies for protection under the ADA if
that individual has a "disability" and is otherwise a "qualified
individual,, 2' so long as that individual's employer employs fifteen or
more employees.22 An individual is deemed to have a "disability" under
the ADA if that individual has (1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of his major life activities; (2) a record of
such an impairment; or (3) been regarded as having such an
impairment.23 Because the ADA's disability definition is disjunctive, a
person need only qualify in one of the three areas.24 The basic definition
of a disability consists of three core components: physical or mental
impairment, substantial limitation, and major life activity.
The federal regulations define a "physical impairment" as "[a]ny
physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or
anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory
(including speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive,
genito-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine."" This term
has been interpreted to protect against discrimination for several types of
disabilities, including: "heart conditions, back problems, high blood
1M Id. § 6(b) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.1(b)).
19. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,21.3 (1994). The relationship between the ADA and other
state laws is expressed as follows:
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies,
rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State or political
subdivision of any State or jurisdiction that provides greater or equal protection
for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this chapter.
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to preclude the prohibition of, or the
imposition of restrictions on, smoking in places of employment covered by
subchapter 1, in transportation covered by subchapter 11 or III of this chapter, or
in places of public accommodation covered by subchapter II1 of this chapter.
Id. § 12,201(b).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 12,112(a).
22. Id. § 12,111(5)(A).
23. Id. § 12,102(2) (emphasis added).
24. Disjunctive is defined as a term "which is placed between two contraries, by the
affirming of one of which the other is taken away; it usually expressed by the word 'or."'
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (6th ed. 1990).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1) (2001).
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pressure, AIDS, epilepsy, diabetes, alcoholism and sight, hearing, speech
and mobility impairments., 26 However, short-term illnesses and injuries
are not covered by the ADA.27
A "mental impairment" is defined as "[a]ny mental or psychological
disorder, such as mental retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional
or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities." 28  But, traits or
behaviors, such as stress, irritability, chronic lateness, and poor judgment,
which may be linked to a mental impairment, are not considered
impairments under the ADA.29
A substantial limitation exists when a person is "[u]nable to perform a
major life activity that the average person in the general population can
perform," or is "[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to ... the average person.. . ."30 To determine if an
individual is substantially limited in performing a major life activity, it is
necessary to evaluate the (1) nature and severity of the impairment, (2)
the actual or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the actual or
potential long-term impact.3' To add to this formula, the Supreme Court
recently held that mitigating measures, such as eyeglasses,32
medications,33 and even the body's anatomical or physiological systems,
34
26. NANCY L. ABELL, CARA D. MILLER, & LESLIE L. ABBOTr, Emerging Issues in
Employment Law and Litigation: The Americans with Disabilities Act: Rights,
Responsibilities and Recent Results, ALI-ABA Course of Study, VPB0919 ALI-ABA 231,
252, September 19,2000.
27. Id.
28. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2001).
29. Emerging Issues in Employment Law and Litigation, VPBO919 ALI-ABA at 252
(citing EEOC Psych. Guid., at Quest. No. 2).
30. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i), (ii) (2001). In Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, __ U.S. _, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002), the Supreme Court stated that "[t]he word
'substantial' . . . clearly precludes impairments that interfere in only a minor way with the
performance of manual tasks from qualifying as disabilities." Id. at 691.
31. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (2001). The EEOC has provided the following
guidance:
The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily
based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on
the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual. Some impairments
may be disabling for particular individuals but not for others, depending on the
stage of the disease or disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine
to make the impairment disabling or any number of other factors.
29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.20) (2001).
32. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 472 (1999) (stating that in
determining whether an individual is disabled, items like eyeglasses and contacts should be
considered).
33. See Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999).
2002]
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should be considered to determine whether an individual qualifies as
having a "disability" under the ADA.
A "major life activity" is any activity that "an average person can
perform with little or no difficulty."" The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) identifies activities such as, "caring
for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning and working" as major life activities. 6 These not only
include activities that have a public, economic, or daily aspect, but also
include private activities.37 The determination of whether an activity
constitutes a major life activity is a question of law that the court must
consider. 8
In addition to having an impairment that substantially limits a major
life activity, an individual seeking an accommodation must also be
qualified for the position. An employee that is otherwise qualified is
someone who "satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and
other job-related requirements of the employment position such
individual holds or desires, and who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of such position."'
An individual must satisfy all requirements that are job-related and
consistent with business necessity.
4
In the years to come, it will most likely be AB 2222's expansive
definition of a mental and physical "disability" that will be the focus of a
34. See Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999).
35. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (2001).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2001); 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (2001) ("This list is
not exhaustive."). In Toyota Motor Manuf, Ky., Inc. v. Williams, - U.S. -, 122 S. Ct. 681
(2002), the Court held that "to be substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from
doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives." Id. at 691.
37. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (finding that private activities,
such as reproduction, are major life activities).
3& See, e.g., Poindexter v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 168 F.3d 1228, 1230
(10th Cir. 1999).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (2001).
40. Id. The individual must have "the appropriate educational background,
employment experience, skills, licenses, etc." 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(m) (2001).
The EEOC further stated that "[t]he determination of whether an individual with a
disability is qualified is to be made at the time of the employment decision." It.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(a) (1994). In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, the Supreme
Court determined that an individual's failure to meet any essential job function, even if
the failure was a result of the disability, will preclude protection under the ADA. 527 U.S.
555, 567-66 (1999). In Albertson's, the plaintiff did not meet the DOT's vision standards
for a truck driver position, and as a result, the employer's summary judgment was
affirmed. Id. at 558.
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great deal of litigation. California's definition departs from the federal
definition in three ways. First, under AB 2222, an impairment merely
needs to "limit" an individual's ability to participate in a major life
activity, in contrast to the federal standard which requires an impairment
that "substantially limits" a major life activity. 2  Second, the
determination of whether a limitation exists must be made without the
consideration of mitigating measures.43 This requirement directly
conflicts with the ADA's regulations and a trio of recent Supreme Court
decisions that held mitigating measures must be considered when
determining a person's disability.44 Third, the amendments require that
the term "'major life activities' shall be broadly construed and shall
include physical, mental, and social activities and working., 45 Moreover,
the California Legislature found that "'working' is a major life activity,
regardless of whether the actual or perceived working limitation
implicates a particular employment or a class or broad range of
employments." ' This paper will focus on these three areas of difference.
A discussion of the new provisions contained in AB 2222 must begin
with an appreciation for the development of the FEHA. Accordingly,
this paper first examines the origins and development of the FEHA.
Next, this paper examines the California Supreme Court's decision in
Cassista v. Community Foods47 and its progeny that narrowed the
statutory definition of disability. This paper then analyzes the decisions
that have evaluated AB 2222's retroactive effect. This paper then
compares the ADA's statutory provisions to those of the FEHA, as
modified by AB 2222. Finally, this paper concludes by discussing the
implications that AB 2222 will have on California's disability law.
I. STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT
A. The Origins and Development of the FEHA
In 1959, California enacted the Fair Employment Practices Act
(FEPA), which proscribed employment discrimination on the bases of
42. AB 2222, § 6(c), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12,926.1(c) (stating that under California law only a limitation upon a major life
activity is required, not a substantial limitation, as under the ADA)).
43. Id.
44. See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 565 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527
U.S. 516, 518-19 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999).
45. AB 2222, § 5.5(i)(1)(C), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 12,926(i)(1)(C)).
46. Id. § 6(c) (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.1(c)).
47. 5 Cal. 4th 1050 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
20021
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race, creed, color, national origin, and ancestry."" The California
Legislature amended the FEPA, in 1973, to prohibit discrimination on
the basis of physical handicap, unless the person is unable to perform the
duties of the job in question. 49 The Legislature's definition of "physical
handicap" created three general categories: (1) "impairment of sight,
hearing, or speech"; (2) "impairment of physical ability because of
amputation or loss of function or coordination"; and (3) "any other
health impairment which requires special education or related services."'
48. See Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 1, at 1057-58. The authors noted:
When the wartime Fair Employment Practices Committee was disbanded in
1945, its supporters caused fair employment legislation modeled on the
committee's procedures to be introduced in five states: California, New York,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey. The statutes passed in every state
but California. Fair employment legislation was also proposed to the voters of
California in 1946 as Initiative Measure No. 11, but was defeated by a proportion
of over two to one. Similar measures were introduced in the legislature in 1947,
1949, 1951, 1953, 1955, and 1957, failing every time. Finally, in 1959 a bill
sponsored by Assemblymen Rumford and Hawkins, co-sponsored by 52 other
assemblymen and supported by Governor Edmund G. Brown, was passed by
both houses and signed into law on April 16, 1959.
This new law, entitled the Fair Employment Practices Act, established a five
member Fair Employment Practices Commission to be appointed by the
Governor and an administrative agency, the Division of Fair Employment
Practices, to carry out the policies and dictates of the Commission. The statute
established as the public policy of California that:
[T]he practice of denying employment opportunity and discriminating in the
terms of employment for such reasons foments domestic strife and unrest,
deprives the state of the fullest utilization of its capacities for development
and advancement, and substantially and adversely affects the interests of
employees, employers, and the public in general.
The Commission was given the power to investigate, hold hearings and issue
cease and desist orders. The original act barred employment discrimination on
the basis of race, creed, color, national origin, or ancestry.
There were serious political impediments to similar legislation on the
national level. It was not until 1963 that a comprehensive civil rights bill,
covering accommodations, voting, governmental benefits, and employment, was
introduced. The portion of the bill covering employment discrimination, Title
VII, only passed after numerous amendments stripped the new Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of the power to issue cease and
desist orders or go to court. The EEOC could only investigate complaints and
issue "right-to-sue" letters for private enforcement of the Act. The federal act
did prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, a provision not included in the
1959 California law.
Id. (citations omitted).
49. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1056 (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 1056-57.
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Ultimately, the Legislature enacted the FEHA, which repealed and
recodified the FEPA and the Rumford Housing Act.5'
1. Administering Regulations
In 1980, the newly created Fair Employment and Housing Commission
(FEHC), the agency responsible for administering the FEHA,
promulgated regulations defining "handicapped individual."5 2 Under the
regulation, a "handicapped individual" is defined as a person who "(1)
[h]as a physical handicap which substantially limits one or more major life
activities; (2) [h]as a record of such a physical handicap; or (3) [i]s
regarded as having such a physical handicap."53 This definition mirrors
the one contained in the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973.-
4
Moreover, the regulation defined an "impairment of physical ability due
to loss of function" as "[a]ny physiological disorder or condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin and
endocrine."55
The regulations were amended in 1995, to reflect the changes made by
the California Legislature in 1992.-6 The modified regulations exchanged
the term "handicapped" for "disability. '57 The FEHC defines disability
as an impairment that "limits an individual's ability to participate in
major life activities." The definition of physical disability included a
reference to the California Supreme Court's decision in American
National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission.59
51. See Lisa Martinez, Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc.: Employer's Duty of
Reasonable Accommodation Under California Fair Employment and Housing Act, 26 W.
ST. U. L. REv. 71, 86 & n.76 (1998).
52. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2 § 7293.6 (1980).
53. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1060 (citing [former] CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.6(i)).
This language does not appear in the current regulation.
54. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994). The Rehabilitation Act defines an "individual
with a disability" as any person who "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which
substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." Id. § 706(8)(B).
55. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1060 (citing [then] CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.6(d)
[now (e)]).
56. See infra Part I.A.3.
57. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.6 (1995).
5& Id. § 7293.6(e)(1)(A)(2).
59. Id. § 7293.6(e)(2). For a discussion of American National Insurance Co. v. Fair
Employment & Housing Commission, 32 Cal. 3d 603 (Cal. 1982), see infra Part I.A.2.
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Further, the regulations included a separate definition for "mental
disability," which was added to the statute in 1992. 
6
2. American National Insurance
In American National Insurance Co. v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission,6' the California Supreme Court established the boundaries
for the statutory definition of "physical handicap." Former section
12,926(h) of the FEIA defined a "physical handicap" as an "impairment
of sight, hearing, or speech, or impairment of physical ability because of
amputation or loss of function or coordination, or any other health
impairment which requires special education or related services." 62
When American National was decided, the FEHA's statutory definition
(as opposed to the regulatory definition) "appeared to be more
restrictive than the federal definition" under the Rehabilitation Act.63
In American National, the defendant fired the plaintiff because of high
blood pressure. 6' Claiming that the adverse employment action was the
result of discrimination on the basis of physical handicap, the plaintiff
brought a claim under the FEHA.6  In concluding that high blood
pressure is protected under the FEHA,66 the court determined that a
physical handicap is a condition of the body, which has the "disabling
effect" of making "achievement unusually difficult." 67
Ultimately, the court determined that the conditions enumerated in
former section 12,926(h) 6" were not exhaustive.69 To receive protection
60. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.6(f) (1995). See infra Part I.A.3.
61. 32 Cal. 3d 603 (Cal. 1982).
6Z See supra note 50.
63. Gelb & Frankfurt, supra note 1, at 1095. For the Rehabilitation Act's definition
of "physical handicap," see supra note 54.
64. Am. Nat'l, 32 Cal. 3d at 606.
65. Id. During the administrative phase of the proceedings, the Fair Employment
Practices Commission (FEPC) determined that the plaintiff had been the subject of
discrimination. Id. As such, the FEPC ordered the insurance company to reinstate the
defendant with back pay. Id. The company was unsuccessful in seeking a writ of review in
the superior court, which determined that the record supported the FEPC's findings and
that high blood pressure is indeed a "physical handicap" under the FEPA. Id.
66. Id. at 610 ("We should not conclude that the Legislature intended any such
anomalous result.").
67. Id. at 609 (stating that "Webster's [Dictionary] tells us that a handicap is 'a
disadvantage that makes achievement unusually difficult.' Obviously a condition of the
body which has that disabling effect is a physical handicap") (citation omitted).
68. The definition was significantly altered by the 1992 amendments. See infra Part
A.3. The current definition of "physical handicap" is codified at CAL GOVT CODE §
12,926(k).
69. Am. Nat'l, 32 Cal. 3d at 608-09.
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for a condition not specifically listed, the court stated that an individual
must show "(1) that the illness or defect is physical, and (2) that it is
handicapping. '"70 The court determined that epilepsy, cerebral palsy,
arthritis, and high blood pressure are conditions not expressly listed in
section 12,926(h), but are in fact covered by the statute.7 The dissent
stated that the majority's construction essentially "rewr[o]te the statute
in the guise of construing it."'72 Although the majority construed the
FEHA's definition of physical handicap very broadly, it did exclude non-
physical handicaps, such as mental or economic disabilities as well as "ills
or defects that in fact are not handicapping," such as "digestive,
respiratory, or skin disorders."73
3. 1992 Amendments to the FEHA
Following the passage of the ADA, the California Legislature updated
the FEHA's definition of "handicap" to the more current term
"disability," and enacted a new three-part definition of "physical
disability."74  The new definition stated that a "physical disability"
includes, but is not limited to, all of the following:
(1) Having any physiological disease, disorder, condition,
cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss that does both of the
following:
70. Id. at 609.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 616 (Mosk, J., dissenting). After a lengthy discussion, Justice Mosk
concluded that:
We should therefore refuse to follow the commission's overbroad administrative
construction of the act's definition of "physical handicap." I do not doubt, of
course, that the commission is motivated by a sincere desire to implement the
salutary purposes of this legislation. Nor do I underestimate the practical
difficulties faced by the commission in doing so. But in California the
prohibition against employment discrimination is wholly a creature of statute:
the provisions of this act "are in no sense declaratory of preexisting common law
doctrine but rather include areas and subject matters of legislative innovation,
creating new limitations on an employer's right to hire, promote or discharge its
employees." If the definition of physical handicap set forth in the act is found to
be too limited for its purposes in the light of today's medical knowledge, it is not
for the commission but for the Legislature to rewrite it. In other settings the
Legislature has shown that it knows how to do so with great precision.
For the reasons stated, I would hold that the challenged decision of the
commission was in excess of its jurisdiction, and that the superior court erred in
ruling otherwise.
Id. at 619-20 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
73. Id. at 608.
74. See infra note 75; see also Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, 5 Cal. 4th 1050, 1060 & n.10
(Cal. 1993).
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(A) Affects one or more of the following body systems:
neurological, immunoligical, musculoskeletal, special sense
organs, respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular,
reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, hemic and lymphatic,
skin, and endocrine.
(B) Limits an individual's ability to participate in major life
activities....
(2) Any other health impairment not described in paragraph (1)
that requires special education or related services.
(3) Being regarded as having, or having had, a disease, disorder,
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health
impairment described in paragraph (1) or (2).
(4) Being regarded as having, or having had, a disease, disorder,
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, anatomical loss, or health
impairment that has no present disabling effect but may become
a physical disability as described in paragraph (1) or (2).
Further, the amendments stated that "[i]t is the intent of the
Legislature that the definition of physical disability in this subdivision
shall have the same meaning as the term 'physical handicap' formerly
defined by this subdivision and construed in American National
Insurance Company v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission.
7
1
In addition, the 1992 amendments included, for the first time, a
definition of "mental disability." 77  Under the FEHA, a "mental
disability" included "any mental or psychological disorder such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, or
specific learning disabilities., 78  As a result, the FEHA and its
implementing regulations generally followed those of the ADA,79 which
were, in turn, modeled on the definition contained in the Vocational
75. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926(k) (West 1992); Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1060 (citing
CAL. Gov'T CODE, § 12,926(k). As discussed below, infra Part 11, this definition was
significantly altered by AB 2222.
76. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926(k) (West 1992). The reference to American National
in subsection (k) was dropped in AB 2222. See infra note 206 and accompanying text.
77. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926(i) (West 1992).
78. Id. The definition further states that:
[M]ental disability' does not include conditions excluded from the federal
definition of 'disability' pursuant to Section 511 of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990. Additionally, for purposes of this part, the unlawful use
of controlled substances or other drugs shall not be deemed, in and of itself, to
constitute a mental disability.
Id. (citation omitted).
79. Compare CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12,926(i), (k) (West 1992), supra notes 75-77,
with 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1995).
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Rehabilitation Act of 1973.8' Facially, the only noteworthy difference
between the FEHA and the ADA was FEHA's omission of the term
"substantially" when referring to a condition that "limits" a major life
activity.
B. Cassista v. Community Foods
In Cassista v. Community Foods,8' the California Supreme Court
considered whether the FEHA prohibited "employment discrimination
on the basis of a person's weight." ' The court held that "weight may
qualify as a protected 'handicap' or 'disability' within the meaning of the
FEHA if medical evidence demonstrates that it results from a
physiological condition affecting one or more of the basic bodily systems
and limits a major life activity."" However, the court determined that
plaintiff's condition did not qualify.8M Although the court's holding dealt
directly with the issue of obesity as a limitation on a major life activity,
the court's interpretation of the statutory language was its most
significant contribution.
Although the dispute arose from an alleged incident in the summer of
1987,85 the case did not make it to the California Supreme Court until
80. See Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1060 (1993). The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994), requires that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with
a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... " 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1993).
The Act also defines an "individual with a disability" as any person who "(i) has a physical
or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life
activities, (ii) has a record of such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an
impairment." 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B).
81. 5 Cal. 4th 1050 (Cal. 1993) (en banc).
82. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1052.
83. Id. (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1053. In pertinent part, the court described the facts of the case as follows:
In the summer of 1987, Toni Linda Cassista (plaintiff) applied for one of three
openings at Community Foods, a health food store in the City of Santa Cruz.
Founded as a neighborhood collective in the 1970's, Community Foods normally
employed 16 to 17 people. The duties to be performed by the prospective
employees included running the cash register, stocking 35- to 50-pound bags of
grain, carrying 50-pound boxes of produce, retrieving groceries form the
warehouse, changing 55-gallon drums of honey, and carrying large crates of milk.
To fill the vacancies, Community Foods sought people with grocery store, retail
clerk, cashier and stocking experience. New employees could eventually become
members of the collective with management and ownership interests.
Plaintiff [Cassista] is five feet four inches tall and, at the time she applied to
Community Foods, weighed three hundred and five pounds. She had previously
been employed in several restaurants, managed a sandwich shop and worked as
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after the 1992 amendments were enacted. 6  The court noted that
"[b]ecause neither party raised the 1992 Amendment to section 12926 or
its possible effect on this litigation, we solicited and received
supplemental briefing on the matter.' '8
The court found that the state of the "current and former law are
remarkably consistent."''  The court went further by stating that,
"[i]ndeed, the definition of 'physical disability' adopted by the
Legislature in 1992 has been effectively controlling FEHA claims in
California since 1980.,,89  The court noted that in 1980 the FEHC
promulgated the regulation defining a "physical handicap" as one that
"substantially limits one or more major life activities. "'
The court was cognizant of the fact that the statutory language of the
FEHA only required a "limit" on a major life activity, as opposed to the
"substantial limitation" language that appeared in the regulation. 9 The
court indicated, however, that "[t]he obvious similarity between the 1980
regulation and the 1992 statutory amendment [was] not coincidental."
The court was quick to point out that the origin of both provisions was
the Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973.93  The Vocational
Rehabilitation Act defines an "individual with a disability" as any person
who "(i) has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits
an aide in nursing homes. Plaintiff heard about the openings at Community
Foods through a friend who worked there; she was interested in the job because
she believed that the collective shared her "political awareness of issues and
consciousness and concerns regarding the community and the environment." ...
[P]laintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (Department), alleging discrimination on the basis of her weight.
Shortly thereafter, Community Foods offered plaintiff a position with the store.
She refused the offer, however, because she did not believe the collective had
adequately "educated" itself about the concerns of overweight people. After the
Department determined not to file a complaint in the matter, plaintiff filed suit
against Community Foods and Will Hildeburn alleging that she was denied
employment in violation of the FEHA "in that [they] regarded her as having a
physical handicap, i.e., too much weight." Community Foods answered the
complaint and denied its allegations.
Id. at 1053-54.
86. The case was decided on September 2, 1993. Id. at 1050.
87. Id. at 1058 n.8.
8& Id. at 1059.
89. Id.






one or more of such person's major life activities, (ii) has a record of such
an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.94
The court recognized that it has been common practice for states,
including California, to enact statutes that closely track their federal
counterparts. 95 The court noted that the ADA's definition was modeled
after the Rehabilitation Act, and, in turn, the 1992 amendments to the
FEHA were modeled on the ADA. 6 In finding that the changes in the
FEHA were premised on the ADA, the court surmised that the "result
[was] that [California's] statute ha[d] finally caught up with its [1980]
implementing regulation. "9
The court concluded by describing the harmonization of the two
versions and stating that the "touchstone of a qualifying handicap or
disability is an actual or perceived physiological disorder which affects a
major body system and limits the individual's ability to participate in one
or more major life activities." 9 In sum, the court leaned heavily towards
a "substantial limitation" interpretation of the statutory language.99
94. 29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(B) (1994).
95. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1060.
96. Id.
97. Id. The court also noted that:
The case law also reveals a general consistency between the current and former
versions of section 12926. The regulation, which is now more than a dozen years
old, has regularly informed the courts' decisions. Indeed, every reported
decision to date has either cited, or is consistent with, the regulatory provision.
In Pickrel v. General Telephone Co. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 1058, 1061, for
example, the court relied on the regulation in holding that the plaintiff's back
injury-a physiological disorder affecting the musculoskeletal system-satisfied the
definition of physical handicap. In County of Fresno v. Fair Employment &
Housing Coin. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1541, 1549, the court noted that the
plaintiffs' physical condition, an extreme sensitivity to smoke, constituted a
physiological disorder affecting the respiratory system and therefore qualified as
a physical handicap under the FEHA. (See also Raytheon Co. v. Fair
Employment & Housing Com. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1242, [acquired immune
deficiency syndrome is the result of a virus affecting the human immune system
and therefore constitutes a physical handicap under FEHA.]) Even the
relatively broad holding in American National, 32 Cal.3d 603, was informed and
limited by the fact that the plaintiff alleged a physiological disorder (high blood




99. Id.; see also Elizabeth Kristen, Addressing the Problem of Weight Discrimination
in Employment, 90 CAL. L. REv. 57, 95-98 (2002) (maintaining that AB 2222 would have
likely changed the outcome of the Cassista decision).
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C. Post-Cassista: Courts Fail to Achieve Consensus
In the aftermath of the court's decision in Cassista, the lower courts
failed to reach consensus on whether the FEHA's definitions of
"physical" and "mental" disability"" were identical to the ADA's
singular definition of "disability."'' 1 The split was most evident in the
appellate courts' analysis of mental disability. Similarly, the passage of
AB 2222 has created a rift among the lower courts with respect to the
legislation's retroactive effect.' 2 This issue is currently being resolved by
the California Supreme Court."'3
1. California Appellate Courts: Pre-AB 2222
a. Pensinger v. Bowsmith: Unambiguous Definition of Mental
Disability
In Pensinger v. Bowsmith,"" the Fifth Appellate District of the
California Court of Appeals stated that under section 12,926, "[f]or some
reason, the Legislature imposed a requirement that a physical disability
must limit a major life activity without imposing the same requirement
on a mental disability.""'5  When comparing section 12,926's dual
definition of disability0 6 with the single definition of the ADA,""° the
court stated:
There is no doubt ... that establishing a mental disability for
purposes of the ADA requires a plaintiff to prove that it
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities.
Although the FEHA includes this requirement with respect to
proving a physical disability, it is absent from the definition of
mental disability."'
The court analyzed numerous California statutes that contain singular
definitions for mental and physical disability."9 By way of comparison,
100. See supra notes 75-78.
101. See supra note 23.
102. Compare Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc., 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (Cal.
Ct. App.) (no retroactive effect), superseded by, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Cal. 2001), with
Wittkopf v. Los Angeles, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (Cal. Ct. App.) (retroactive effect),
superseded by, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (Cal. 2001).
103. Wittkopf v. Los Angeles, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (Cal. 2001); Colmenares v.
Braemar Country Club, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Cal. 2001).
104. 60 Cal. App. 4th 709 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
105. Id. at 711.
106. Cassista, 5 Cal. 4th at 1060.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1995).
10& Pensinger, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 721.
109. Id. The court noted that:
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the court noted that the Legislature was capable of changing the
definition of "mental disability" in section 12,926 if they wished to do
so." ° Although the court "question[ed] the wisdom of making the hurdle
higher for a person who has suffered the loss of a limb to prove he or she
suffers from a disability for purposes of the FEHA, than it is for a person
who ... [suffers from a mental disability]," they were clear to point out
that they were "not at liberty to ignore the plain language of the statute
or supplant [their] judgment for that of the Legislature. ' '..
b. Muller v. Automobile Club: Ambiguous Definition of Mental
Disability
Approximately one month after the Fifth Appellate District's decision
in Pensinger, the Fourth Appellate District came to a very different
conclusion. In Muller v. Automobile Club,"2 the Fourth Appellate
District of the California Court of Appeals found that it was "clear the
Legislature intended to conform California's employment discrimination
statutes to the ADA by extending protection to persons with mental
disabilities, and intended, in accordance with the ADA, to uniformly
define 'mental disability' as a mental impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity.""' 3 The court reached its conclusion despite the
contrary finding in Pensinger.'
4
Undoubtedly, the Legislature was aware of the definitions of mental and physical
disability included in the ADA because it referred to it repeatedly in enacting
the [1992] amendment to the FEHA. Undoubtedly, the Legislature also knew
how to amend the FEHA to include a requirement that a mental disability effect
must limit a major life activity, if it wished that result. This is evident from the
other provisions of California law that were amended in 1992 along with the
FEHA; specifically, Business and Professions Code section 125.6; Civil Code
section 54; Education Code section 44101; and Government Code section 11135.
In each of these sections the Legislature amended the definition of "disability" to
mirror that of the ADA, and include a requirement that the physical or mental
disability "substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of the
individual." Yet, it did not include this requirement in the definition of mental
disability under the FEHA.
Id. at 722.
110. Id.
111. Id. (citing California v. Woodhead, 43 Cal. 3d 1002, 1007 (Cal. 1987)).
112. 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
113. Id. at 580.
114. Id. at 580 n.6.; contra Pensinger, 60 Cal. App. 4th at 722. In Perez v. Proctor &
Gamble Mfg. Co., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2001), the court briefly discussed the
split among the lower state courts:
The California courts of appeal are split on whether a plaintiff must show the
mental disorder limits a major life activity. One California court of appeal has
held that the FEHA, like the ADA, requires that the mental disorder
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The court acknowledged that the definition of "mental disability" in
section 12,926, unlike the definition of "physical disability," contains no
qualifying language.' 5 The court recognized that, on its face, the
definition of "mental disability" was unambiguous; however, the court
went on to say that, "viewed in the overall context of section 12,926, it
creates an ambiguity as to whether the Legislature intended to provide to
employees with minor or temporary mental disorders protection that is
denied to employees with minor or temporary physical disorders.'
1 6
substantially limit one or more major life activities. Muller v. Auto. of S. Cal., 61
Cal.App.4th 431, 442-443, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 573 (1998). Another court of appeal
has held that the plaintiff need only establish that he or she suffers from a mental
disorder and need not show that the disorder limits his or her life in any way.
Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc., 60 Cal.App.4th 709, 722, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 531 (1998).
This matter is further complicated by recent amendments to the FEHA.
Effective January 1, 2001, the definition of "mental disability" was amended as
follows:
"Mental disability" includes, but is not limited to, all of the following: (1)
Having any mental or psychological disorder or condition, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, or specific
learning disabilities, that limits a major life activity ....
Cal.Gov.Code § 12926(i) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
With respect to whether the FEHA, as it existed prior to the 2001
amendments, required a plaintiff to show that his or her mental disorder limits
one or more of the major life activities, the court agrees with the decision in
Pensinger and respectfully disagrees with the decision in Muller, and finds that
prior to the 2001 amendments, a plaintiff was not required to show that his or her
mental disorder limits, substantially or otherwise, one or more of the major life
activities. In reaching this same conclusion, the Pensinger court noted that
although the definition of physical disability required that the physical disorder
limit one of the major life activities, the definition of mental disability did not.
The court further noted that while the Legislature amended the FEHA in 1992
to include "mental disability" as one of the prohibited bases for discrimination in
employment, it did not include the limitation requirement. Finding no ambiguity
in the plain language of the statute, the Pensinger court held that an employee
with a mental disorder need not show that such disorder limits one or more of his
major life activities. The court finds this reasoning persuasive.
Id. at 1120-21 (footnote omitted).
115. Muller, 71 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 579.
116. Id. at 579 (emphasis in original). The Muller court described its analysis of the
statute, in pertinent part, as follows:
When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain legislative intent so as to
effectuate the purpose of a particular law. Of course our first step in determining
that intent is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and
commonsense meaning. When the words are clear and unambiguous, there is no
need for statutory construction or resort to other indicia of legislative intent,
such as legislative history. But language that appears unambiguous on its face
may be shown to have a latent ambiguity; if so, a court may turn to customary
rules of statutory construction or legislative history for guidance.
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Moreover, the court compared the definition of "mental disability"
contained in section 12,926 to the definition contained in section
12,955.3, which pertains to housing discrimination."' As the court noted,
section 12,955.3 defines disability as "'[a] physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities."'" 8
While the definition contained in the housing section of the FEHA was
quite specific, the terms "emotional illness" and "mental illness" used in
section 12,926 could be "broadly construed to include [a] myriad [of]
temporary mental or psychological disorders that are not truly disabling
because they do not impair any of the afflicted person's major life
activities. ""9
In light of the numerous other California statutes that use the ADA-
style definition of mental disability, '2° the court could "think of no good
reason why the Legislature would define 'mental disability' more broadly
in the context of employment discrimination than in the context of.. • • .. ,,12,
housing discrimination. In sum, the court equated the definitional
discrepancies to mere "legislative oversight."'2
c. Swenson v. Los Angeles: Expanding Pensinger
In Swenson v. Los Angeles, 23 the Second Appellate District of the
California Court of Appeals held that the FEHA's "legislative definition
does not require that an individual have a qualifying mental disability
Furthermore, we must assume that the Legislature has in mind existing laws
when it enacts a statute. We must also interpret a statute in context, examining
other legislation on the same or similar subject, to ascertain the Legislature's
probable intent. Therefore we may attempt to gain insight into the intended
meaning of a phrase or expression by examining use of the same or similar
language in other statutes. Statutory language which seems clear when
considered in isolation may in fact be ambiguous or uncertain when considered
in context.
Id. at 579 (citing Quarterman v. Kefauver, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1366, 1371 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997)).
117. Id.
11& Id. (citing CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,955.3(a) (2000)).
119. Id.
120. Id. The court identified CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 11,135(c), 19,231(a)(1); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE §§ 125.6, 17,206.1(b)(2); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 54, 1761(g); CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 44,101(b), 44337; CAL. INS. CODE § 10,144; and CAL. REv. & TAX CODE §
24,383(f), as examples of California statutes that use the ADA's definition of "mental
disability." Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 580 n.6.
123. 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
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that 'substantially limits' or even 'limits' a major life activity."' 24 In
Swenson, the plaintiff suffered from a learning disability which
compromised his ability to complete tasks related to his job.1 2 The
plaintiff requested several accommodations, but the employer did not
respond. 26 The employer eventually terminated the plaintiff, who later
brought suit under the FEHA. 27
The trial judge instructed the jury that "[a]n employee has a mental
disability when he has or is regarded by his employer as having any
mental disorder or condition which affects one or more major life
activities."' ' The judge refused to give the defendant's proposed jury
instruction that would have defined a disability as "a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of [an] individual."' 29 After the plaintiff received a favorable
jury verdict,3° defendant appealed contending that the trial court erred in
not instructing the jury in accordance with the ADA's definition of
disability.'3 '
Under the FEHA, the definition of mental disability, which was not
included in the FEHA until 1992,132 includes:
[A]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as mental
retardation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities. However, "mental
disability" does not include conditions excluded from the
federal definition of "disability" pursuant to Section 511 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12211).
Additionally, for purposes of this part, the unlawful use of
controlled substances or other drugs shall not be deemed, in
and of itself, to constitute a mental disability.33
The appeals court suggested that the statutory "definition contains no
express requirement as to the degree of disability that must result from a
condition in order to trigger the statutory protection it provides."' 34
124. Id. at 575 (citing Pensinger v. Bowsmith, Inc., 60 Cal. App. 4th 709, 721 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1998)).
125. Id. at 573-74.




130. Id. The plaintiff was awarded $532,000 in economic damages and $370,000 in
non-economic damages, as well as $268,210 in attorney's fees. Id.
131. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1995) (defining disability under the ADA).
132. See supra notes 77-78.
133. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(i) (2000).
134. Swenson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 575.
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The court stated further that while the ADA contains a single
definition for both physical and mental disabilities,'35 the FEHA contains
separate definitions of each term.'36 Although the ADA's single
definition of disability requires a showing of a substantial limitation to a
major life activity, the court noted that "[n]either the plain language of
the FEHA definitions of 'mental disability' or of 'physical disability'
contains such a requirement.', 3 7  Hence, "[t]he legislative definition
[under the FEHA] does not require that an individual have a qualifying
mental disability that 'substantially limits' or even 'limits' a major life
activity."'38 Ultimately, the court concluded that the clear text of the
FEHA imposes a different standard than the ADA.13 9
Swenson was under review when AB 2222 became effective on January
1, 2001.14° On January 24, 2001, pursuant to rule 29.4(c) of the California
Rules of Court,41 the court dismissed review as improvidently granted.142
2. California Appellate Courts: Post-AB 2222
Since January 1, 2001, the date on which AB 2222 became effective,
the California appellate courts have focused on the statute's retroactive
effect. The Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals
has lead the way in this regard and has seen an internal split develop on
the issue.




139. Id. at 574.
140. Swenson v. Los Angeles, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Cal. 2001).
141. Rule 29.4(c) of the California Rules of Court, entitled Dismissal of Review,
states:
The Supreme Court may dismiss review of a cause as improvidently granted and
remand the cause to the Court of Appeal. The order of dismissal and remand is
final forthwith and shall be sent by the clerk to all parties and to the Court of
Appeal. On filing of the order in the Court of Appeal, the decision of the Court
of Appeal shall become final and the clerk of the Court of Appeal shall issue a
remittitur forthwith. The opinion of the Court of Appeal remains unpublished,
under rule 976(d), unless the Supreme Court expressly orders otherwise.
CAL. RULES OF COURT 29.4(c). The Advisory Committee Comment notes that:
If the Supreme Court dismisses review as improvidently granted under
subdivision (c), the cause is restored to the posture it had before the Supreme
Court granted review: the decision of the Court of Appeals is final. If the
Supreme Court wishes to reconfer jurisdiction on the Court of Appeal, it will do
so by transfer under subdivision (b), (d), or (e).
Id.
142. Swenson, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 572.
2002]
Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 51:495
a. Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank: Assuming Retroactivity
Jensen v. Wells Fargo Bank,' a case which arose prior to AB 2222, was
not decided until after the Governor signed the bill. 4 In Jensen, the
Second Appellate District of the California Court of Appeals held that
"the plain meaning of the language used in the FEHA's definition of
mental disability, and the absence of any potential absurd result from
following the plain language, require us to follow the Legislature's
language and give a broader meaning to mental disability than to
physical disability."'45 The court expressly rejected the Fourth Appellate
District's reasoning in Muller.'
The court followed the rationale it employed in Swenson.'47 However,
it found its position supported by the enactment of AB 2222.' 4 The court
stated that "[a]ssuming [AB 2222] represents a legislative attempt to
clarify the existing statute, it would apply to cases which predate its
passage."' 49
b. Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc.: AB 2222 Affecting
Radical Change
In Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. ,' a decision superseded
by California Supreme Court review, ' a panel for the Second Appellate
District of the California Court of Appeals came to a different conclusion
than the judges in Swenson and Jensen.52 The Colmenares panel
concluded that the provisions contained in AB 2222 should be applied
143. 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
144. The case was decided on December 5, 2000, twenty-six days before AB 2222
became effective on January 1, 2001.
145. Jensen, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
146. Id.
147. See supra Part l.C.l.c.
148. Jensen, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 64.
149. Id. at 64 (citing W. Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 4th 232 (Cal. 1997))
(emphasis added).
150. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 719 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), superseded by, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336
(Cal. 2001). On August 22, 200t, the California Supreme Court granted review of the
Second Appellate District's decision in Colmenares v. Braernar Country Club, Inc., 111
Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Cal. 2001). In accordance with the court's grant of review and the
California Rules of Court 976, 977, and 979, the Second District's decision may not be
cited as authority. CAL. RULES OF COURT 29.4(c).
151. Colmenares, 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Cal. 2001).
152. The panel in Colmenares consisted of Judge Vogel, Presiding Judge Spencer, and
Judge Ortega. In Jensen, the panel consisted of Judge Curry, Acting Presiding Judge
Epstein, and Judge Hastings.
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prospectively because it resulted in a significant change to the law
surrounding the definition of physical disability.'53
First, the court stated that the statute's construction and grammatical
structure speaks to the state of the law at some future time.' 4 Second,
the court found that sections 12,926.1 and 12,926(k) substantially
changed existing law and expanded the burden on employers to
accommodate employees.'55 The court concluded that with these
changes, "[t]he true meaning of the statute [did] not remain the same.'
56
Third, the panel relied on the old saying that "it is unfair to change the
'rules of the game' in the middle of a contest."'57 The court noted that
this interpretation has special application when legal doctrines are
involved.5 s Fourth, the panel stated that the courts are the final arbiter
of a statute's meaning, not the legislature.5 9 The court questioned how
the California Legislature could speak authoritatively when AB 2222 was
enacted eight years after the 1992 Amendments to the FEHA and seven
years after the California Supreme Court's decision in Cassista.1'
The panel also addressed the earlier decision in Jensen v. Wells Fargo
Bank161 by dismissing it.' 62 Reflecting on the Jensen panel's interpretation
153. Colmenares, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 722-23.
154. Id. In explaining that the Legislature's intent in enacting AB 2222 was
prospective, the Colmenares panel stated that:
[T]he statute is intended to result in broader coverage, that state law is to be
interpreted to require only a limitation that makes a major life activity
"difficult," not a "substantial limitation" and that, notwithstanding the
[California] Supreme Court's decision in Cassista [v. Cmty. Foods, 856 P.2d 1143
(Cal. 1993) (en banc)], the Legislature's present intent is to require a different
interpretation in the future.
Id. at 723.
155. Id. The court noted that:
These amendments substantially change existing law so that an employer must
now make accommodations for not only those employees who met the
"substantial limitation" test articulated in Cassista, but also for those with
limitations that are not substantial but merely make "the achievement of [a]
major life activity difficult."
Id. (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,926.1(d), 12,926(k)(1)(B)(ii)).
156. Id. (citing W. Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 4th 232, 243 (Cal. 1997)).
157. Id.
158. Id. (citations omitted).
159. Id. (citing W. Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 244).
160. Id. at 723-24. The panel stated that "'there is little logic and some incongruity in
the notion that one Legislature may speak authoritatively on the intent of an earlier
Legislature's enactment when a gulf of decades separates the two bodies." Id. at 723
(quoting W. Sec. Bank, 15 Cal. 4th at 244)). For a thorough discussion of the 1992
Amendments to the FEHA, see supra Part I.A.3. For a thorough discussion of Cassista,
see supra Part I.B.
161. 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); see also Part I.C.2.a.
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regarding AB 2222's role in clarifying the pre-existing law in California,
the Colmenares court stated that it had no binding effect.' 6 As such, it
cannot be considered legal authority to support any proposition.'
64
c. Wittkopf v. Los Angeles: AB 2222 Merely Clarifying Existing Law
In Wittkopf v. Los Angeles,'6 a reconfigured Second Appellate District
panel concluded that AB 2222 has "no true retrospective effect" because
it merely clarifies the existing law and does not change it.'66 The Wittkopf
decision was issued less than two months after the Second Appellate
District's Colmenares decision. 67 The Wittkopf panel based its decision
on principles of statutory construction and a chronic misreading by
courts of the California Supreme Court's seminal decision in Cassista.'
61
The court stated that statutes operate prospectively unless the
legislature is clear that the statute should be retroactively applied. 69 The
court also stated, however, that this principle is inapplicable when the
statute is intended merely to clarify the existing state of the law.'70 In
Wittkopf, the panel found the exception controlling because AB 2222
does not create a radical change in California's disability law, but only
serves to clarify it. 7'
The most significant aspect of the Wittkopf decision is its treatment of
the decision in Cassista. The court stressed the facial differences
between the definitions of physical disability contained in the FEHA and
the ADA.172 The court then noted that "[n]otwithstanding the significant
162. Colmenares, 107 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 724.
163. Id.
164. Id. (citing Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 21 Cal. 4th 1,21, 143 (Cal. 1999)).
165. 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 543 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001), superseded by, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23
(Cal. 2001). On October 10, 2001, the California Supreme Court granted review of the
Second Appellate District's decision in Wittkopf v. Los Angeles, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (Cal.
2001). In accordance with the court's grant of review and the California Rules of Court
976, 977, and 979, the Second District's decision may not be cited as authority. CAL.
RULES OF COURT 29.4(c).
166. Id. at 549.
167. The panel in Wittkopf consisted of Judges Boland, Acting Presiding Judge
Johnson, and Judge Woods. In Colmenares, the panel consisted of Judge Vogel, Presiding
Judge Spencer, and Judge Ortega. See supra note 1.52.
168. Wittkopf, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. For a thorough discussion of Cassista, see supra
Part I.B.
169. Wittkopf, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 548 (citing Bank of Am. v. Angel View Crippled
Children's Found., 72 Cal. App. 4th 451,457 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
170. Id. at 548-49.
171. Id. at 549.
172. Id. The court noted that:
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gap in the language of these two statutes, a number of courts have
mistakenly equated FEHA's standard with the more exacting definition
in the ADA."'173 The Wittkopf court attributed this "significant gap" on
the courts' "misreading" of the Cassista decision.7 4
In parsing Cassista, the panel pointed to the decision's language stating
that the 1992 amendments to the FEHA finally caught up to its
implementing regulations.'75  The Wittkopf court considered this
language mere dicta.7 6 The panel stated that the Cassista court's holding
is found in the following passage:
[I]t is a relatively simple matter to harmonize the current and
former versions of section 12926. Under both, the touchstone
of a qualifying . . . disability is an actual or perceived
physiological disorder which affects a major body system and
limits the individual's ability to participate in one or more major
life activities. 77
Despite the "admittedly confusing" dicta in the opinion, the court
concluded that between FEHA's clear language and the holding in
Cassista, the statutory definition of physical disability under the FEHA
has never required a plaintiff to show more than an impairment that
"limits" a major life activity.' 78
The Wittkopf court found its decision supported by two events. First, it
found that after Cassista the FEHA's implementing regulations were
amended to define a "physical disability" as a condition that "'[Ilimits an
individual's ability to participate in major life activities."" 79  Second,
unlike the panel in Colmenares, the Wittkopf panel relied on the
When Wittkopf was terminated in 1998, FEHA defined physical disability, in
pertinent part, as any physiological disorder or condition that affects an
enumerated body system, including the special sense organs, and "[l]imits an
individual's ability to participate in major life activities." As written, section
12926 omitted any mention of the "substantial" limitation on a person's ability to
participate in major life activities required by federal law. In contrast to the
language in FEHA, an individual is "disabled" under the ADA's definition only
if he or she has "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such an individual," or has a record of or is
regarded as having such an impairment.
Id. (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 549.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Wittkopf, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 549-50.
177. Id. at 550 (quoting Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, 5 Cal. 4th 1050, 1061 (Cal. 1993) (en
banc)) (emphasis added).
178. Id.
179. Id. (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.6(e)(1)(A)(1)-(2)) (emphasis added).
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legislature's declaration that the FEHA has always provided more
protections than the ADA.'O Ultimately, the court concluded that AB
2222 was intended only to clarify the FEHA and therefore cannot be
retroactive.81
3. The California Supreme Court to Provide the Final Word on
Retroactivity
At the time this article is going to print, the California Supreme Court
is in the process of determining the retroactivity issue.'1s To date, several
courts have weighed in on the issue.
For example, in Perez v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing
Company, "" the court found that AB 2222 did not apply retroactively.'
The court found that the definition for physical disability had not
changed but made a different finding for the definition of mental
disability:
[P]rior to the 2001 amendments, FEHA's definition of mental
disability did not require a limitation of any kind. As amended,
FEHA's definition of mental disability requires a limitation.
180. Id. at 550-51; see supra note 14.
181. Id. (citing W. Sec. Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 4th 232, 243-44 (Cal. 1997)). In
recognizing that its decision contradicted the earlier decision in Colmenares, the Wittkopf
court stated:
We are aware a different result was recently reached on this issue in
Colmenares v. Braemar Country Club, Inc. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 778.
Respectfully, we disagree with that decision. In concluding that the language of
the 2000 amendment implied a legislative intention that, for cases filed after
January 2001, FEHA's definition of physical disability would depart dramatically
from the path it had shared with the ADA, Colmenares ignores the explicit
legislative recognition that, at and before the time of this amendment, the law in
California "in the area of disabilities provide[d] protections independent from
those in the [ADA]," and had "always" done so.
Moreover, in concluding that the 2000 amendment created a new definitional
"distinction" between FEHA, which requires a mere "limitation" on one's ability
to participate in one or more major life activities, and the ADA which has always
required such a limitation be "substantial" which the Legislature intended to
apply only "in a time yet to come," Colmenares also ignores the fact that this
very "distinction" has always existed in the language of the two statutes. For the
reasons discussed above, we conclude that the true definition of physical
disability in FEHA remains unchanged. Now, as before, a plaintiff need
demonstrate only that his physical disability impairs at least one major life
activity.
Id. at 550 n.1.
182. Wittkopf v. Los Angeles, .113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 23 (2001); Colmenares v. Braemar
Country Club, Inc., 111 Cal. Rptr. 2d 336 (Cal. 2001).
183. 161 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (E.D. Cal. 2001).
184. Id. at 1121.
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Accordingly, the meaning of the term mental disability has
changed, and thus, the 2001 amendments are not a mere
clarification as they apply to the definition of mental disability,
and thus, apply prospectively only. 81
The state courts that have commented on the issue have been less
definitive. In Rebhan v. Atoll Holdings, Inc.,' the court intimated that
the California Supreme Court would likely uphold the Colmenares
decision and find that AB 2222 is not retroactive.i s7 Conversely, in
Vaughan v. Jacobs & Jacobs,1" the same panel made the assumption that
the amendments were retroactive.1 9 In other words, the Vaughan panel
assumed that the California Supreme Court would overturn Colmenares
and uphold Wittkopf. 9° If the California Supreme Court concludes that
the amendments are to be applied retroactively, the practical effect will
be that many lawsuits that would have been dismissed under the previous
standard will proceed to trial.
II. STATUTORY COMPARISON
One of the main components of AB 2222 is section 12,926.1, which
consists of five relatively short subsections.1 91 Section 12,926.1(a) states
185. Id.
186. No. B140612, 2001 WL 1190434 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2001) (unpublished),
rehearing denied Nov. 1, 2001. CAL. RULE OF COURT 977(a) prohibits courts and parties
from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published,
except as specified by 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for puposes of CAL. RULE OF COURT 977.
187. Id. at *3 ("Even if our Supreme Court concludes the FEHA amendments and
addition are prospective only, Escorp's position would not be advanced.").
188. No. B144394, 2001 WL 1383170 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2001) (unpublished),
review granted Jan. 29, 2002. CAL. RULE OF COURT 977(a) prohibits courts and parties
from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published,
except as specified by 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for puposes of CAL. RULE OF COURT 977.
189. Id. at *2 ("Assuming the legislation is retroactive ... .
190. See id.
191. Section 12,926.1 states:
(a) The law of this state in the area of disabilities provides protections
independent from those in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(Public Law 101-336). Although the federal act provides a floor of protection,
this state's law has always, even prior to passage of the federal act, afforded
additional protections.
(b) The law of this state contains broad definitions of physical disability, mental
disability, and medical condition. It is the intent of the Legislature that the
definitions of physical disability and mental disability be construed so that
applicants and employees are protected from discrimination due to an actual or
perceived physical or mental impairment that is disabling, potentially disabling,
or perceived as disabling or potentially disabling.
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that "[a]lthough the [ADA] provides a floor of protection, this state's law
has always, even prior to passage of the federal act, afforded additional
protections. 192 Regardless of whether the California Supreme Court
concludes that AB 2222 is a change or clarification of the existing law,
section 12,296.1 dramatically alters the landscape for disability
discrimination claims in California. Although the three categories below
are discussed discretely, they are significantly interrelated.
A. Limitation Versus Substantial Limitation
1. The ADA's "Substantial Limitation" Requirement
The ADA defines a disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more ... major life activities. '" 193 The ADA
also contains provisions for people who have a record of or are regarded
as having a physical or mental impairment.
194
(c) Physical and mental disabilities include, but are not limited to, chronic or
episodic conditions such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, epilepsy, seizure disorder,
diabetes, clinical depression, bipolar disorder, multiple sclerosis, and heart
disease. In addition, the Legislature has determined that the definitions of
"physical disability" and "mental disability" under the law of this state require a
"limitation" upon a major life activity, but do not require, as does the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, a "substantial limitation." This distinction is
intended to result in broader coverage under the law of this state than under that
federal act. Under the law of this state, whether a condition limits a major life
activity shall be determined without respect to any mitigating measures, unless
the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity, regardless of federal law
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Further, under the law of this
state, "working" is a major life activity, regardless of whether the actual or
perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a class or
broad range of employments.
(d) Notwithstanding any interpretation of law in Cassista v. Community Foods
(1993) 5 Cal.4th 1050, the Legislature intends (1) for state law to be independent
of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, (2) to require a "limitation"
rather than a "substantial limitation" of a major life activity, and (3) by enacting
paragraph (4) of subdivision (i) and paragraph (4) of subdivision (k) of Section
12,926, to provide protection when an individual is erroneously or mistakenly
believed to have any physical or mental condition that limits a major life activity.
(e) The Legislature affirms the importance of the interactive process between the
applicant or employee and the employer in determining a reasonable
accommodation, as this requirement has been articulated by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission in its interpretive guidance of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.
AB 2222, § 6, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. Gov'T CODE §
12,926.1).
192. Id. § 6(a).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(a) (1995).
194. Id. §§ 12,102(2)(b) & (c).
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An impairment is classified as "substantially limiting" if it renders an
individual "[u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform." '95  Additionally, an
individual that is "significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which
the average person in the general population can perform that same
major life activity" is also substantially limited under the ADA. 96
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,' 7 the Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he ADA does not define 'substantially limits,' but 'substantially'
suggests 'considerable' or 'specified to a large degree."'' 98 To determine
whether a person is substantially limited in a major life activity, the
following factors should be considered: (1) the nature and severity of the
impairment; (2) its duration or anticipated duration; and (3) its long-term
impact.' 99 Because each inquiry is fact specific, determining whether an
individual is substantially limited is made on a case-by-case basis.2
2. AB 2222's Clarification of FEHA's "Limitation" Requirement
In contrast, section 12,296.1(c) states, in pertinent part, that:
[T]he Legislature has determined that the definitions of
"physical disability" and "mental disability" under the law of
this state require a "limitation" upon a major life activity, but
do not require, as does the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990, a "substantial limitation." This distinction is intended to
result in broader coverage under the law of this state than under
that federal act.20'
The legislature reinforces this point by stating that "[n]otwithstanding
any interpretation of law in Cassista v. Community Foods (1993) 5 Cal.
4th 1050, the Legislature intends ... (2) to require a 'limitation' rather
195. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i) (2001).
196. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii) (2001).
197. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
198. Id. at 491.
199. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2)(i)-(iii) (2001); 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.20) (2001).
200. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Maine, Inc., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting
that although the plaintiff had a mental impairment, he was not substantially limited
because the condition was short-lived and not sufficient to impose a legal duty);
Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 783-84 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that a
substantially limiting impairment for one individual may not be substantially limiting for
another individual with different characteristics).
201. See AB 2222, § 6(c), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 12,926.1(c)).
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than a 'substantial limitation' of a major life activity . . . ." 2 Under AB
2222, an impairment will now be found to "limit" a major life activity if it
merely makes the achievement of the major life activity "difficult." 203
Prior to the passage of AB 2222, subsection (k) of section 12,926 stated
that "[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that the definition of 'physical
disability' in this subdivision shall have the same meaning as the term
'physical handicap' formerly defined by this subdivision and construed in
American National Insurance Company v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission. '2°  The current legislation drops the reference to the
"unusually difficult" standard found in the American National decision, 2




The California Legislature provides no further statutory guidance
regarding these terms.
AB 2222 diverges from the ADA by including a non-exhaustive list of
chronic or episodic conditions that are per se physical or mental
impairments.2 °7 These per se conditions include: "HIV/AIDS, hepatitis,
epilepsy, seizure disorder, diabetes, clinical depression, bipolar disorder,
multiple sclerosis, and heart disease..''. This differs from the case-by-
case inquiry required under the ADA.29
B. Consideration of Mitigating Measures
On June 22, 1999, the Supreme Court issued a series of opinions
holding that mitigating measures, such as eyeglasses, medication, or the
body's own systems, must be assessed to determine whether an
impairment "substantially limits one or more major life activities.,
21
1
Thus, the Supreme Court disagreed with a majority of the circuit courts
that had previously ruled on the issue,21' as well as the weight of the
legislative history,"2 and the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance.2 3
202. Id. § 6(d) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12,926.1(d)).
203. Id. §§ 5.5(i)(1)(B), (k)(1)(B)(ii) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
12,926(i)(1)(B), (k)(1)(B3)(ii)).
204. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926(k) (West 2000).
205. 32 Cal. 3d 603, 609 (Cal. 1982).
206. AB 2222, § 5.5(k), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. GOV'T
CODE 12,926(k)).
207. Id. § 6(c) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.1(c)).
208. Id.
209. See supra note 200.
210. See Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
211. Diane L. Kimberlin & Linda Ottinger Headley, ADA Overview and Update.
What Has The Supreme Court Done To Disability Law?, 19 REV. LITIG. 579, 586 (2000)
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1. EEOC Regulations & Interpretive Guidance
Under the ADA, the EEOC was given the responsibility of developing
the regulations necessary to properly enact Title I, the section of the
ADA dealing with employment. On July 26, 1991, the EEOC
promulgated its final regulations defining each of the three components
of the statutory term for a disability.215  Simultaneously, the EEOC
published an appendix to the regulation, entitled Interpretive
Guidance.1 6
When the ADA was enacted, the EEOC's "Interpretive Guidance"
stated that "[t]he determination of whether an individual is substantially
limited in a major life activity must be made on a case-by-case basis,
without regard to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or
("A majority of the federal circuit courts of appeals had agreed with the position adopted
by the EEOC and ruled that whether or not the individual's impairment substantially
limits a major life activity should be determined by an examination of the effects the
impairment would have in the absence of mitigating measures.").
212. See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial
Interpretations of the Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 53, 64
(2000). In her article, Professor Parmet concludes:
The drafters of the ADA were remarkably cognizant of the mitigating
measures issue. The matter was addressed explicitly in several committee
reports. For example, the Report of the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Resources stated clearly that "whether a person has a disability should
be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating measures, such as
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids." Identical language appeared in
the Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor. That report
further stated that:
For example, a person who is hard of hearing is substantially limited in the
major life activity of hearing, even though the loss may be corrected through the
use of a hearing aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or
diabetes, which substantially limit a major life activity are covered under the first
prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are
controlled by medication. The House Committee on the Judiciary made similar
observations.
This is not to say that there is no ambiguity in the legislative history. For
example, the drafters were clear that the ADA should be generally read in
accordance with the Rehabilitation Act precedent. Yet, while most cases
decided under that Act either interpreted the definition of disability broadly, or
simply assumed the existence of a disability, by the late 1980s a few courts had
begun to parse the statute's definition of disability, questioning its application to
certain "non-traditional" disabilities. None of these courts, however, appears to
have relied explicitly upon the existence of mitigating measures as a rationale for
rejecting a finding of disability.
Id. (citations omitted).
213. See infra note 217.
214. 42 U.S.C. § 12,116 (1994).
215. 56 Fed. Reg. 35,734 (1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630 (1991)).
216. Id. at 35,726 & 35,734 (1991) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630 (1991)).
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prosthetic devices. 217 Further, the EEOC suggested that "[t]he existence
of an impairment is to be determined without regard to mitigating
measures ....,,28 However, it is critical to note that these guidelines do
not carry the force of either law or regulation but are merely, as the
Eleventh Circuit noted, based on a "permissible construction" of the
ADA. 219
The Supreme Court strongly disagreed with the EEOC's position
when it issued its series of decisions concerning mitigating measures.220
On June 8, 2000, the EEOC issued an amended final rule rescinding
portions of its Interpretive Guidance, making its suggestions consistent
with the position of the Supreme Court.22'
2. Supreme Court Weighs In On Mitigating Measures: The Sutton
Trilogy
a. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.
In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc. ,2 the petitioners were identical twin
sisters who were denied positions as global airline pilots because they
failed to meet the airline's minimum visual requirements due to their
severe myopia.2  The sisters sued the airline alleging that the minimum
visual requirements were discriminatory and therefore violated the
ADA.24 Although the sisters' visual acuity was 20/200, or worse, in each
of their eyes, with the use of corrective lenses they both had 20/20
vision.22 The claims stated that not only did they have a disability under
the ADA, but also that the airline "regarded" them as having a
disability. 26 The trial court dismissed the claims on the grounds they
failed to prove that their condition qualified as a disability under the
217. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999).
21& Id., app. § 1630.2(h) (1999) (citations omitted).
219. Harris v. H&W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996).
220. See Albertson's v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999); Murphy v. United Parcel
Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
221. 65 Fed. Reg. 36,327 (June 8, 2000) ("This rule rescinds several sentences of the
[EEOC] Interpretive Guidance on Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act that
address mitigating measures used by persons with impairments. This action is necessary as
a result of recent Supreme Court rulings.").
222. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
223. Id. at 475-76.
224. Id. at 476.
225. Id. at 475.
226. Id. at 476; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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ADA.27  On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the
district court.2* The Supreme Court granted the petitioners' writ of
certiorari to resolve the conflict that had arisen among the circuits.229
The Supreme Court determined that petitioners were not disabled
within the meaning of the ADA since their corrected vision was 20/20 in
both eyes and could function fully with corrective lenses3 0 The Court
held that the positive and negative effects of the measures taken to
mitigate an impairment must be considered in determining if a person is
disabled under the ADA.3 The Court found that petitioners failed to
state a claim under section 12,102(2)(A) of the ADA.232 The Court's
holding was based on three separate provisions of the ADA.233
First, the majority examined the language and grammatical structure of
the ADA's definition of disability.24 The ADA defines a disability as "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual." 5  By focusing on "limits," the
227. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., No. 96-S-121, 1996 WL 588917, at *6 (D. Colo.
Aug. 28, 1996), affd, 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997). The district court determined that
because the sisters' visual impairment could be fully corrected, they were not substantially
limited in any major life activity and, therefore, failed to state a recoverable claim under
the ADA. Id.
228. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 906 (10th Cir. 1997), affd, 527 U.S.
471 (1999). The circuit court determined that the petitioners' condition could be
categorized as a physical impairment under the ADA. Id. However, the court also stated
that mitigating measures should be considered when making the determination of whether
the impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. Id. The Tenth
Circuit concluded that the sisters' corrected vision could not be categorized as a disability
limiting the major life activity of seeing. Id. at 903.
229. Compare Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir.)
(mitigating measures should be taken into account when determining a disability), ajTd,
527 U.S. 516 (1999), and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir.)
(same), affd, 527 U.S. 471 (1999), with Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Examiners, 156
F.3d 321, 329 (2d Cir. 1998) (self-accommodations cannot be considered when determining
a disability), vacated, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999); Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626,
629-30 (7th Cir. 1998) (disabilities determined without reference to mitigating measures),
and Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937-38 (3d Cir. 1997)
(same), and Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Texas, Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470-71 (5th
Cir. 1998) (some impairments should be determined in their uncorrected state), vacated,
199 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 1999).
230. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-89.
231. Id. at 482.
232. Id. at 488-89.
233. Id. at 482 (stating that "[t]hree separate provisions of the ADA, read in concert,
lead us to this conclusion").
234. Id. at 482-83.
235. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Court noted that this is the present indicative form of the verb.2 As
such, the term "limits" denotes an impairment that presently limits a
major life activity and not one that could limit a major life activity at
some future point.2 7 Therefore, a person whose disability has been
corrected through the use of a mitigating measure does not have a
disability that substantially limits a major life activity.
238
Second, the Court noted that the EEOC's guidelines, requiring the
evaluation of disabilities in an unmitigated state, would create a system
where employers must make disability determinations based on general
information about how an unmitigated condition generally affects
people.239 This is contrary to the majority's opinion, which noted that the
ADA's definition of a disability requires the evaluation "with respect to
an individual." ' The Court found that this system was "contrary to both
the letter and the spirit of the ADA."24'
Third, the Court studied the legislative history of the ADA and
determined that Congress did not intend to provide statutory protection
to all of the people whose unmitigated impairments could potentially fit
under the Act's definition of a disability.242 The Court found that forty-
three million Americans have one or more disabilities.2 43 Although the
forty-three million figure was higher than that of several other have
studies that attempted to quantify the number of disabled Americans,
244
the Court concluded that if Congress had intended to include all
unmitigated impairments, then the number would have been much
larger.8 5 Additionally, the Court pointed to 100 million people that have
vision impairments 46 The Court also pointed to the more than twenty-
eight million people who are hearing impaired,247 and nearly fifty million
people who suffer from high blood pressure.2 48
236. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 483.
239. Id. at 481-83.
240. Id. at 472; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1994).
241. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484.
242 Id.
243. Id.
244. See id. at 484-85.
245. Id. at 487.
246. Id. (citing NATIONAL ADVISORY EYE COUNCIL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVICES, VISION RESEARCH - A NATIONAL PLAN: 1999-2003 7 (1998)).
247. Id. (citing NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, NATIONAL STRATEGIC
RESEARCH PLAN: HEARING AND HEARING IMPAIRMENT V (1996)).
248. Id. (citing BAILLIERE TINDALL, STALKING A SILENT KILLER: HYPERTENSION,
BUSINESS & HEALTH 37 (1998)).
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Although the Court declined to extend ADA protection to the
petitioners' correctable myopia, the Court clarified that mitigating
measures are not in themselves a per se disqualifier under the ADA.249 In
addressing the petitioners' second claim, the majority noted that a party
who has taken mitigating measures may still qualify for disability
protection if they are regarded as being disabled.250
b. Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
In Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,2" the petitioner was
terminated from his position as a mechanic due to his high blood
pressure. 22 One of the essential functions of the petitioner's job was to
drive commercial motor vehicles.253 The petitioner's unmedicated blood
pressure was approximately 250/160 and was still a very high 186/124 in
its mitigated state.-" Petitioner's blood pressure exceeded the levels
allowable under the Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations
permitting the operation of a commercial motor vehicle. 55
Notwithstanding the petitioner's high blood pressure, he began work for
his employer.) Once the oversight was detected, petitioner's blood
pressure was retested and still measured between 160/102 and 164/104. 2 7
249. Id. at 488-89, 492-93. The Court cited the example of a person who used a
prosthetic foot. Id. at 488. He could still be substantially limited in the major life activity
of walking because of a substantial limitation on his ability to walk or run. Id.
250. Id.
251. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
252. Id. at 518.
253. Id. at 519.
254. Id. In a blood pressure reading systolic pressure represents the pressure while the
heart is beating and diastolic pressure is the pressure while the heart is resting between
beats. About High Blood Pressure, http://www.americanheart.org/
presenter.jhtml?identifier=468 (last visited Nov. 8, 2001). The American Heart
Association states that:
Blood pressure of less than 140 over 90 is considered a normal reading for adults.
A systolic pressure of 130 to 139 or a diastolic pressure of 85 to 89 needs to be
watched carefully. A blood pressure reading equal to or greater than 140
(systolic) over 90 (diastolic) is considered elevated (high).
Id.
255. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 519. The DOT Regulations mandate that "[a] person shall
not drive a commercial motor vehicle unless he/she is physically qualified to do so and...
has on his/her person.., a medical examiner's certificate that he/she is physically qualified
to drive a commercial motor vehicle." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(a) (1998)). Under the
regulations, a motor vehicle operator may have "no current clinical diagnosis of high
blood pressure likely to interfere with his/her ability to operate a commercial vehicle
safely." Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. § 391.41 (b)(6) (1998)).
256. Id. at 520.
257. Id.; see also supra note 254 for interpretation of the blood pressure readings.
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The petitioner filed suit under the ADA asserting that he was disabled
under the Act, and alternatively, that he was "regarded as disabled"
when he was terminated.258 In granting the respondent's motion for
summary judgment, the district court determined that the petitioner's
"'impairment should be evaluated in its medicated state."''2 9 The district
court decided that "when petitioner is medicated he is inhibited only in
lifting heavy objects but otherwise functions normally," and is therefore
not disabled under the ADA.26° The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision on the grounds that the petitioner's medicated condition
did not prevent him from functioning normally.26' The Supreme Courtaffirmed the Tenth Circuit's decision.262
c. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg
In Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,263 a truck driver claimed that he was
fired because he had an uncorrectable eye condition.2 6 The employer
claimed that they were forced to release Kirkingburg because he failed to
meet the federal mandates concerning truck drivers.26
Before starting his employment, Kirkingburg underwent an eye
examination to determine if he met the federal vision standards for
commercial truck drivers.2 6  The DOT regulations require a "distant
visual acuity of at least 20/40 in each eye and distant binocular acuity of
at least 20/40. ",267 Kirkingburg was diagnosed as having amblyopia, an
uncorrectable eye condition that produces monocular vision. 68 Despite
25& Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518-19.
259. Id. at 520 (citing Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 872, 881 (D.
Kan. 1996)).
260. Id. (citing Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 881-82). Moreover, the district court rejected
petitioner's "regarded as" claim because the employer fired the petitioner because he was
not a certifiable driver under the DOT regulations and not because they regarded him as
being disabled. Id. (citing Murphy, 946 F. Supp. at 882).
261. Id. (citing Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 141 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 1999);
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997)). The Tenth Circuit
also denied petitioner's claim that he was regarded as disabled stating that his termination
was not based "'on an unsubstantiated fear that [petitioner] would suffer a heart attack or
stroke,' but 'because his blood pressure exceeded the DOT's requirements for drivers of
commercial vehicles."' Id. at 520-21 (citation omitted).
262. Id. at 521. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, dissented from the majority's
opinion on the same grounds as in Sutton. Id. at 525 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
263. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
264. Id. at 559-60.
265. Id. at 560-61.
266. Id. at 558.
267. Id. at 558-59 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b)(10) (1998)).
268. Id. at 559.
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his amblyopia, the doctor mistakenly certified that Kirkingburg met the
DOT requirements."' As a result of his certification, he began his job as
270a commercial truck driver for his employer.
Approximately two years later, Kirkingburg's eyes were re-examined
and the previous mistake was detected.21 The doctor informed him that
his condition did not comport with the DOT regulations, and he would
be required to obtain a waiver.72 Kirkingburg eventually obtained a
waiver, but not until after his employer terminated him.273 Moreover, the
employer refused to rehire Kirkingburg once he obtained his waiver.274
Kirkingburg brought an action under the ADA in federal district court.275
The district court granted Albertson's motion for summary judgment,
stating that there was no duty to allow additional time to obtain a DOT
waiver as a reasonable accommodation. 276 The Ninth Circuit reversed the
277"
decision of the lower court 77 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.278
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court determined that
monocular vision is not a per se disability under the ADA.279 The Court
focused on three areas where the court of appeals made "missteps."
First, the Court noted that the Ninth Circuit's decision undercut the
requirement that an impairment substantially limit a major life activity to
be considered a disability by substituting "difference" for "significant
restriction." 28  Second, the circuit court disregarded the ability of




272. Id. at 559-60.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 560.
275. Id. at 560-61.
276. Id.
277. Kirkingburg v. Albertson's, Inc., 143 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1998), rev'd, 527
U.S. 555 (1999).
278. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
279. Id. at 566 ("While some impairments may invariably cause a substantial limitation
of a major life activity, we cannot say that monocularity does." (citation omitted)); see also
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999) ("Standing alone, the allegation
that respondent has a vision requirement in place does not establish a claim that
respondent regards petitioners as substantially limited in the major life activity of
working.").
280. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 562-67.
281. Id. at 564-65.
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therefore, mitigate his disability.22 Third, the Ninth Circuit disregarded
the statutory obligation that disabilities be determined on a case-by-case
basis.2 Moreover, the Supreme Court held that under the ADA, an
employer "who requires as a job qualification that an employee meet an
otherwise applicable federal safety regulation," is not required to "justify
enforcing the regulation solely because its standard may be waived in an
individual case."
3. Mitigating Measures Under the FEHA
Contrary to the current state of the federal law, AB 2222 states that
"[u]nder the law of [California], whether a condition limits a major life
activity shall be determined without respect to any mitigating measures,
unless the mitigating measure itself limits a major life activity, regardless
of federal law under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990."28'
This action brought the FEHA in line with the EEOC's 1991 Interpretive
Guidance.2"
In AB 2222's legislative history, the California Legislature, in no
uncertain terms, stated that it disagreed with the Sutton decisions. The
legislative history, citing the Fair Employment and Housing
Commission's support of AB 2222, stated that:
AB 2222 is significant legislation because, among other things,
the bill would clarify that a physical disability under California
law is to be determined without consideration of mitigating
measures such as medications, assistive devices, corrective
lenses, etc. The bill would send a clear message that California
is not in accord with the recent trilogy of United States
Supreme Court decisions in Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999)
119 S. Ct. 2139, Murphy v. UPS (1999) 119 S. Ct. 2133, and
Albertson's v. Kirkingburg (1999) [119] S. Ct. 2162 that found
that, in determining whether a person has a disability under the
ADA, consideration must be given to such mitigating
287measures.
282. Id. at 565-66 (concluding that "[w]e see no principled basis for distinguishing
between measures undertaken with artificial aids, like medications and devices, and
measures undertaken, whether consciously or not, with the body's own systems").
283. Id. at 556 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,101(2) (1994)).
284. Id. at 558.
285. AB 2222, § 6(c), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. GOV'T
CODE 12,926.1(c)).
286, See supra Part I.B.1.





Further, the Legislature noted that "AB 2222 ... expressly disavows
the holdings in the three recent decisions [Sutton, Murphy, and
Albertson's], which interpret the ADA."'
C. Definition of Major Life Activity
1. ADA's Definition of "Major Life Activity"
The EEOC defines major life activities as those that an "average
person in the general population can perform with little or no
difficulty."' 9 The examples of such activities cited by the EEOC include
walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, working,
performing manual tasks, caring for oneself, sitting, standing, lifting, and
reading.2 9 The Tenth Circuit has found that sleeping is a major life
activity because it "is a basic activity that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty, similar to the
major life activities of walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, working, sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching.,
291
In Sutton, the plaintiffs claimed that their condition substantially
limited them in the major life activity of working.29 Although the Court
avoided the issue of whether working is a major life activity,293 it noted
that "[t]he inability to do a specific job does not substantially limit the
major life activity of working."294 The EEOC regulations cited by the
Court identify several factors that courts should consider when making
the determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in the
major life activity of working.295 These factors include "the geographical
area to which the individual has reasonable access, and 'the number and
types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities,
288. Id. The Legislature noted that:
California courts often use federal precedent in interpreting state employment
discrimination law, because "(F)ederal employment discrimination legislation in
many ways is quite similar in wording and intent to the FEHA, and California
courts have found it helpful to rely on federal precedent to interpret the
analogous portions of state law."
Id. (citing Mixon v. Fair Emp. & Housing Comm'n, 192 Cal. App. 3d 1306 (Cal. Ct. App.
1987)). However, the Legislature expressly stated that "California courts are not bound
by federal interpretations of employment discrimination law." Id.
289. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (2001).
290. See id.
291. Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999).
292. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490 (1999).
293. Id. at 492.
294. Id. at 491 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2001)).
295. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A)-(C) (2001).
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within the geographical area, from which the individual is also
disqualified.'
z2
In Sutton, the Court determined that the substantial limitation
classification in the major life activity of working is one in which the
person "must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized
job, or a particular job of choice." '  The Court further noted that "[i]f
jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique
talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of
jobs."2 98 And that "if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is
not precluded from a broad range of jobs.
29
The Court found that since the position of "global airline pilot" was a
single job and not a class of jobs, the plaintiffs were unable to support
their claim that they were substantially limited in the major life activity
of working.3°° The Court cited a number of similar jobs, such as regional
pilot and pilot instructor, for which the plaintiffs would have been
qualified. 3'
In Duncan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority7Y a
recent decision from the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Judge
Randolph outlined several problems with labeling working as a major life
activity.0 3 First, Judge Randolph pointed out the circular nature of
pleading working as a major life activity."" While a "person claims to be
excluded from work because of his impairment .. .the nature of his
impairment [is] 'exclusion from work.""'3 5 Second, he pointed out that
several potential inconsistencies arise when "working" is selected as the
impaired major life activity.3"
296. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(A), (B) (2001)).
297. Id. at 492.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 493.
301. Id. The EEOC's Interpretive Guidance indicates that "an individual who cannot
be a commercial airline pilot... but who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot for
a courier service, would not be substantially limited in the major life activity of working."
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1999)).
302. 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
303. Id. at 1117-18 (Randolph, J., concurring).
304. Id. at 1117 (Randolph, J., concurring).
305. Id. (Randolph, J., concurring).
306. Id. at 1118. (Randolph, J., concurring). Judge Randolph stated:
When "working" is used [as the impaired major life activity], the existence of a
disability will necessarily turn on factors other than the individual's physical
characteristics or medical condition. To illustrate, suppose there is an economic
downturn and unemployment is high. Then more people will be found to be
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Judge Randolph's principle concern was the lack of consistency that is
prevalent when dealing with the major life activity of working. He notes
that the inquiry is likely to shift from the individual's actual impairment
to "whether there are jobs in some undefined region 'utilizing an
individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents)' . . . ."0
Despite the extensive discussion that "working as a major life activity"
received in Duncan, the District of Columbia Circuit did not decide
whether it is appropriate to treat working as a major life activity for
ADA purposes.3 Only the Second and Fifth Circuits have definitively
held that working is a major life activity under the ADA.3°9
2. FEHA's Broad Definition of "Major Life Activity"
Section 12,926 of the California Government Code instructs the reader
that "major life activities shall be broadly construed and shall include
physical, mental, and social activities and working."31  The express
inclusion of working in the statute, as opposed to its inclusion merely in
the regulation, expands FEHA's definition far beyond that of the
AA311ADA .
The existing regulation relating to physical disability, which was
promulgated prior to the passage of AB 2222, identified major life
activities as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual
disabled as compared with a period when the gross domestic product is growing
and unemployment is low. Why? Because the less likely it is that a person can
find work the more likely that he is substantially limited in the major life activity
of working-that in other words he suffers from a disability. One must wonder
whether people considered disabled in a poor economy can become not disabled
if the economy turns around and more jobs become available. One must wonder
as well how this can be squared with the ADA's express purpose of supplying
"clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination against
individuals with disabilities." Geographic disparity also cannot be avoided.
Take two identical individuals with identical impairments working for the same
company. One works in a sparsely populated rural area, the other in a large
metropolis. The individual in the rural area would wind up being classified as
disabled under the ADA more readily than the person in the major metropolitan
area where more jobs are available.
Id. (Randolph, J., concurring).
307. Id. (Randolph, J., concurring) (citing Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S.
471,492 (1999)).
308. Id. (Randolph, J., concurring) ("[B]efore we decide whether to join the two
circuits which, after Sutton, treat 'working' as a major life activity under the ADA." (citing
Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 226 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000); EEOC v. R.J.
Gallagher Co., 181 F.3d 645, 654 (5th Cir. 1999)).
309. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
310. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,926(i)(1)(C) (West 2001) (emphasis added).
311. Id.
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tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and
working." '312 Additionally, the regulation noted that, "[p]rimary attention
is to be given to those life activities that affect employability, or
otherwise present a barrier to employment or advancement.
313
As noted in Sutton, when asserting that the major life activity of
working is limited, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he is precluded from
a range or broad class of jobs.314 Under section 12,926.1, there is no
doubt that working is deemed to be a major life activity. Section
12,926.1(c) states, in pertinent part, that "under the law of this state,
'working' is a major life activity, regardless of whether the actual or
perceived working limitation implicates a particular employment or a
class or broad range of employments.35  This directly contradicts the
ADA.
316
312. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.6(e)(1)(A)(2)(a) (2001).
313. Id.
314. See supra notes 298-99. In Duncan v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit
Authority, 240 F.3d 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 49 (2001), Judge Tatel, in
a concurring opinion, analyzed the passage from Sutton relating to the exclusion from a
broad class or range of jobs as follows:
This passage [Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491-92 (1999)] gives
plaintiffs attempting to prove disability on the basis of a substantial limitation in
the major life activity of working a choice: they may demonstrate that their
impairment excludes them from "either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in
various classes." As the penultimate sentence explains, plaintiffs attempting to
prove exclusion from a "class of jobs" must show that their impairment
disqualifies them from jobs utilizing their skills. In Sutton, for example, the
Supreme Court said that airline pilots who have impairments that preclude them
from working as global pilots but who can nonetheless hold "a number of other
positions utilizing [their] skills, such as regional pilot and pilot instructor" cannot
claim to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Id. at 493.
According to the final sentence in the Sutton passage, plaintiffs attempting to
prove exclusion from a "broad range of jobs"--the second of the two options--
must show that there is not a "host" of different types of jobs available to them.
As an example of a person who might claim to be precluded from a broad range
of jobs, the EEOC Interpretive Guidance describes an individual who "has an
allergy to a substance found in most high rise office buildings, but seldom found
elsewhere, that makes breathing extremely difficult." 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §
1630.2(j). Of course, after Sutton, such a person would also have to show that
jobs not in high rise buildings are unavailable, leaving some doubt as to whether
plaintiffs would any longer attempt to make such a claim.
Id. at 1119 (Tatel, J., concurring).
315. AB 2222, § 6(c), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12,926.1(c)).
316. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF AB 2222
AB 2222 clearly signals that a lower standard applies for determining
whether an employee has a disability under the FEHA as compared with
the ADA. This is underscored when (1) any reference to Cassista and
the adoption of the "substantially limited" standard is expressly removed
from the statute, and (2) the "unusually difficult" language derived from
American National was also dropped."7 The requirement that a disability
need only limit a major life activity to the point of making it difficult,
significantly reduces the claimant's hurdle.3"8  This is easily
distinguishable from the Supreme Court's guidance in Sutton, where it
was noted that although "[t]he ADA does not define 'substantially
limits,' .... 'substantially' suggests 'considerable' or 'specified to a large
degree."'319
Prior to the passage of AB 2222, approximately eighty percent of
disability claims were dismissed prior to trial because the plaintiff was
not deemed to be disabled under the statute. 32  As one commentator
stated, "'[t]he definition of disability is the whole ballgame in these
cases."' 32' One immediate effect of AB 2222's expansive definition of
disability is that more discharge and failure to hire cases will survive
summary judgment motions and move towards final resolution at the
trial stage, where the battle will be whether or not there was a
"reasonable accommodation" 322 or if such an accommodation creates an
317. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 206.
319. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,491 (1999).
320. Michael Joe, Amendment Draws Line in Disability Law, THE RECORDER, Jan. 2,
2001, at 1.
321. Margaret Steen, New California Law Challenges the Definition of Disability, SAN
JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 12,2000, at 3C.
322. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12,940(a) (West 2001). As amended by AB 2222, section
12,940(a) of the California Government Code states:
(1) This part does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging
an employee with a physical or mental disability, or subject an employer to any
legal liability resulting from the refusal to employ or the discharge of an
employee with a physical or mental disability, where the employee, because of
his or her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential
duties even with reasonable accommodations, or cannot perform those duties in
a manner that would not endanger his or her health or safety or the health or
safety of others even with reasonable accommodations.
(2) This part does not prohibit an employer from refusing to hire or discharging
an employee who, because of the employee's medical condition, is unable to
perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations, or
cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not endanger the
employee's health or safety or the health or safety of others even with reasonable
accommodations. Nothing in this part shall subject an employer to any legal
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"undue hardship. '"3  Although the precise definitions of "limits" and
"difficult" are not fleshed out in the statutory language and will have to
be addressed by the courts, it is clear that the barrier to being classified
as disabled has been significantly lowered.
The areas of "reasonable accommodation" and "undue hardship" are
more problematic for employers because they invariably create a triable
issue of fact.2 4 Under Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc. ,3 in order to
comply with the reasonable accommodation provisions, employers have
liability resulting from the refusal to employ or the discharge of an employee
who, because of the employee's medical condition, is unable to perform his or
her essential duties, or cannot perform those duties in a manner that would not
endanger the employee's health or safety or the health or safety of others even
with reasonable accommodations.
Id. (emphasis added). The FEHA defines a "reasonable accommodation" as either of the
following:
(1) Making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to, and usable
by, individuals with disabilities.
(2) Job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a
vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, adjustment
or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for
individuals with disabilities.
Id. § 12,926(n); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2, § 7293.9(a) (2001) ("Reasonable
accommodation may, but does not necessarily, include, nor is it limited to, such measures
as: (1) Accessibility ... (2) Job restructuring, reassignment to a vacant position ....").
323. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,940(m) (West 2001). As amended by AB 2222, section
12,940(m) of the California Government Code states:
For an employer or other entity covered by this part to fail to make reasonable
accommodation for the known physical or mental disability of an applicant or
employee. Nothing in this subdivision or in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision
(a) shall be construed to require an accommodation that is demonstrated by the
employer or other covered entity to produce undue hardship to its operation.
Id. (emphasis added).
324. In Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. granted in part, 532
U.S. 970 (2001), the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment, finding that the
defendant's:
[F]ailure to engage in the interactive process, liability would be appropriate if a
reasonable accommodation would otherwise have been possible. There remains
conflicting evidence in the record as to whether a reasonable accommodation
without undue hardship to the employer was possible. Thus, a triable issue of
facts exists on this issue.
Id. at 1117. See also Rowe v. San Francisco, No. C 00-03676 BZ, 2002 WL 257585, at *3
(N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2002) ("[A]n employer cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage
if there is a genuine dispute as to wehther the employer engaged in good faith in the
interactive process.") (citing Barnett, 228 F.3d at 1116); Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc,
62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) ("'Ordinarily, the reasonableness of an
accommodation is an issue for the jury."') (quoting Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp.
991, 997 (D. Or. 1994)).
325. 53 Cal. App. 4th 935 (1997).
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an affirmative duty under the FEHA to advise disabled employees of
alternative positions.326 The Prilliman duty, coupled with AB 2222's
affirmative duty to engage in the interactive process,3 27 places a
considerable burden on employers who are made aware that an
employee is disabled.
Although the new statutory scheme lowers the bar for employees
bringing claims of physical disability, it arguably erects a hurdle for
employees claiming a mental disability.3z2 At the time of AB 2222's
passage, the California Supreme Court's decision in Cassista made it
clear that the "substantially limited" test applied to physical disabilities.3 29
However, the courts were split regarding the test for mental disabilities.
In Pensinger, the court stated that "[flor some reason, the Legislature
imposed a requirement that a physical disability must limit a major life
activity without imposing the same requirement for a mental
disability."330  In Swenson, the court of appeals followed the
interpretation in Pensinger and noted that the FEHA's "legislative
definition does not require that an individual have a qualifying mental
disability that 'substantially limits' or even 'limits' a major life activity.
331
However, in Muller another court of appeals disagreed and attributed
any difference between the definitions of physical and mental disability
to "mere legislative oversight."' 32 The synchronization of the definitions
for mental and physical disabilities is one rational aspect of AB 2222.
Nonetheless, the burden for proving a disability is now too low. The
over-inclusiveness of AB 2222 perverts the true purpose of the statute,
namely to provide protection to people with actual disabilities, and erects
a framework that protects people with only marginal disabilities that may
have no effect on their ability to perform their duties.
Compounding the boundless definition of disability is the fact that AB
2222 creates per se limitations, including: "HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, epilepsy,
seizure disorder, diabetes, clinical depression, bipolar disorder, multiple
326. Id. at 950-51. For a thorough discussion of Prilliman v. United Air Lines, Inc., see
Martinez, supra note 51, at 74-75.
327. See supra note 16.
32& See Perez v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121 (E.D. Cal.
2001) ("[P]rior to the 2001 amendments, FEHA's definition of mental disability did not
require a limitation of any kind. As amended, FEHA's definition of mental disability
requires a limitation.").
329. See supra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
330. Pensinger v. Bowsmith, 60 Cal. App. 4th 709, 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
331. Swenson v. Los Angeles, 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 572, 575 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000); see supra
Part I.C.I.c.
332. See supra note 122.
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sclerosis, and heart disease." '333 Because these conditions are evaluated
regardless of whether they are "chronic" or merely "episodic," they will
create a significant group of people that will automatically qualify for
coverage under the Act, rather than on an individualized basis.334 By
creating these per se limitations, the new FEHA removes one more
potential barrier for plaintiffs to be deemed disabled. Because the
statute provides no clear guidance regarding the terms "chronic" or
"episodic," it is likely that will be a key battleground in the courts.335
In addition to a more inclusive statutory definition of disability, the
California Legislature's mandate to ignore mitigating measures expands
the number of people who will be covered under the FEHA.336 The
Sutton trio of cases significantly narrowed the class of persons entitled to
protection under the ADA by requiring the consideration of mitigating
measures.337 One commentator noted prior to the passage of AB 2222
that:
The new ADA decisions [Sutton, Murphy, and Albertson's] may
also have little immediate impact on California employers. The
California Fair Employment and Housing Act ("FEHA")
definition of disability is similar to the ADA: a physical or
mental impairment that "substantially impacts" a "major life
activity." However, recently one California appellate court
ruled that a mental impairment need not substantially impact a
major life activity to be a "disability." Further, the California
Supreme Court has held that employees may maintain common
law claims for "workplace injury discrimination" if the injury
rises to the level of a "disability." Unfortunately, the court
offered no guidance as to what type of "disability" could give
rise to such a common law claim. While the California courts
might look to the recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions for
guidance, in the meanwhile cautious California employers
should interpret the term "disability" broadly to include
virtually any type of workplace injury or mental impairment.338
333. AB 2222, § 6(c), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 12,926.1(c)).
334. See supra note 201.
335. The dictionary defines "chronic" as "marked by long continuation or frequent
recurrence." WEBSTER'S THIRD INT'L DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 402 (3d ed. 1993). The dictionary defines "episodic" as "made up of
separate esp. loosely connected episodes." Id. at 765.
336. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.1(c) (2001).
337. See supra Part Il.B.
338. Davis, Wright, Tremaine, LLP, Phil Clements & Tahl Tyson, Contributing
Editors: Anne Denecke & Liz Staggs-Wilson, Supreme Court Restricts ADA Definition of
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The FEHA's new framework, as amended by AB 2222, makes these
words prophetic.
Under AB 2222, the Legislature clarifies that disabilities are to be
determined regardless of mitigating measures."' As a result, employers
may be forced to make disability determinations based on general
information about various conditions, rather than individualized
information regarding the individual's condition.' By following a less
restrictive view than the one espoused by the Supreme Court in Sutton,
California is creating a potential pool of plaintiffs that rivals the state's
population. 34' However, one practitioner stated that, "'I think the saving
grace for companies is this: It would be incredibly difficult for an
employee to prove that he was terminated for a disability in a case where
the mitigating measure completely corrected the disability.... ."'342
Moreover, the express inclusion of working as a major life activity will
expand the constituent group covered by the statute. Federal law defines
the major life activity of "working" as a class or broad range of jobs in a
given field. 3 In Sutton, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]hen the
major life activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory
phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs allege
they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs."34 Because of the broad
class requirement, plaintiffs have a more difficult time proving that their
disability implicates the major life activity of working.345 The Sutton
Court alluded that had the plaintiffs claimed that they were limited in the
major life activity of "seeing," the outcome might have been different. 36
"Disability" (Summer 1999), at http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Jan. 16, 2001)
(emphasis added).
339. AB 2222, § 6(c), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12,926.1(c)).
340. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471,482 (1999).
341. The 2000 census figures show that California has a population of nearly 33.9
million people. http://factfinder/census.gov/servlet/BasicFactsServIet (last visited Nov. 1,
2001).
342. Steen, supra note 321 (quoting Raymond H. Hixson Jr., Esq., Fenwick & West
LLP).
343. See supra Part II.C.1.
344. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
345. See Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. P'ship, 209 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir. 2000)
(affirming lower court's holdings that plaintiff's phobia that left her unable to drive in
unfamiliar areas did not substantially limit her major life activity of working because a
broad range of jobs remained available). Plaintiff was precluded from asserting other
major life activities because she only pled working at the trial court. Id. at 684.
346. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492-94. The Court stated:
Assuming without deciding that working is a major life activity and that the
EEOC regulations interpreting the term "substantially limits" are reasonable,
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The inclusion of "working" in AB 2222, however, means that the
impairment need only limit a particular job held by the employee, as
opposed to the broad class or range of jobs. This expansion moves
working from a residual major life activity to a primary one. 7 This
removes a major impediment for plaintiffs when choosing which major
life activity is affected.4  Although the plaintiffs in Sutton were
unsuccessful in their attempts to be classified as substantially limited in
the major life activity of working under the ADA, 49 there is little doubt
that they would have succeeded under AB 2222. As suggested by Judge
Randolph's concurring opinion in Duncan, this could lead to individuals
petitioners have failed to allege adequately that their poor eyesight is regarded as
an impairment that substantially limits them in the major life activity of working.
They allege only that respondent regards their poor vision as precluding them
from holding positions as a "global airline pilot." Because the position of global
airline pilot is a single job, this allegation does not support the claim that
respondent regards petitioners as having a substantially limiting impairment. See
29 CFR § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (1998) ("The inability to perform a single, particular job
does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working").
Indeed, there are a number of other positions utilizing petitioners' skills, such as
regional pilot and pilot instructor to name a few, that are available to them.
Even under the EEOC's Interpretative Guidance, to which petitioners ask us to
defer, "an individual who cannot be a commercial airline pilot because of a
minor vision impairment, but who can be a commercial airline co-pilot or a pilot
for a courier service, would not be substantially limited in the major life activity
of working." 29 CFR pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2.
Petitioners also argue that if one were to assume that a substantial number of
airline carriers have similar vision requirements, they would be substantially
limited in the major life activity of working. Even assuming for the sake of
argument that the adoption of similar vision requirements by other carriers
would represent a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working, the
argument is nevertheless flawed. It is not enough to say that if the physical
criteria of a single employer were imputed to all similar employers one would be
regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity of working only as a
result of this imputation. An otherwise valid job requirement, such as a height
requirement, does not become invalid simply because it would limit a person's
employment opportunities in a substantial way if it were adopted by a substantial
number of employers. Because petitioners have not alleged, and cannot
demonstrate, that respondent's vision requirement reflects a belief that
petitioners' vision substantially limits them, we agree with the decision of the
Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of petitioners' claim that they are
regarded as disabled.
Id. (citations omitted).
347. Id. at 492 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (1998)) (stating that
"working [should be] viewed as a residual life activity, considered, as a last resort, only '[i]f
an individual is not substantially limited with respect to any other major life activity')
(emphasis omitted).
348. See supra Part II.C.l.
349. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482.
Assembly Bill 2222
being classified as disabled based on economic and geographic factors,
rather than their actual physical or mental condition.35°
The expansion of the FEHA's definition of disability through any one
of the above-mentioned changes would have significantly increased the
number of potential plaintiffs; however, the cumulative effect of all three
areas of expansion creates the potential that a significant percentage of
the state's population will be classified as disabled. The practical effect
of AB 2222 is the removal of several statutory filters preventing a person
from being classified as disabled. One practitioner recently stated, "I
wonder what is not going to be considered a disability." '351
Quite surprisingly, there was little organized resistance to AB 2222.
352While more than thirty groups actively supported the bill's passage,
only seven groups officially opposed the bill.353 With such token public
opposition, the bill sailed through the Assembly with fifty-eight percent
of the vote,"' and passed the Senate by a vote of nearly two to one.
Several questions remain unanswered. First, how far will the
Commission be willing to go when drafting the new regulations
implementing AB 2222? Second, will the courts strictly adhere to the
statutory language or be more cautious with their rulings? Third, will the
courts treat AB 2222 as a "change" or "clarification" to disability law in
California, as stated in section 12,926.1? Finally, how important of a role
will federal case law play?
The answers to the above questions will likely establish the direction of
disability law in California. In the immediate future, however, it is likely
that the courts will be flooded with many questionable, if not meritless,
claims; a result rejected by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in
Sutton.356 It is difficult to imagine how the courts will accommodate this
350. See supra note 307.
351. Joe, supra note 320, at 1.
352. Senate Rules Committee, Third Reading, Aug. 28, 2000, http://www.
leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-00/bill/asm/ab_2201-2250/ab_2222_cfa_20000829_091548_sen
_floor.html (listing supporters).
353. Id. (listing opponents).
354. The breakdown of the roll call vote in the Assembly, which occurred on August
31, 2000, was forty-four AYES and thirty-two NOES. http://www.leginfo. ca.gov/pub/99-
00/billasm/ab_2201-2250/ab_2222_vote_20000831_ 0335pmasmfloor.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 2001).
355. The breakdown of the Senate roll call vote, which occurred on August 29, 2000,
was twenty-one AYES and thirteen NOES. http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/99-
00/billasm/ab_2201-2250/ab_2222_vote_20000829_0618pm...senfloor.html (last visited
Nov. 8, 200 1).
356. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 521 U.S. 471, 510 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("It has also been suggested that if we treat as 'disabilities' impairments that may be
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expected increase in FEBA claims. In the meantime, it seems as though
the ADA is a dead letter in California, especially in light of the superior
remedies available under the FEHA.357
IV. CONCLUSION
Following the federal government's passage of the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act in 1973, and the ADA in 1990, the FEHA and its
predecessor, have borne strong resemblance to its federal counterparts.
However, effective January 1, 2001, California's disability law expressly
diverges from federal law, and in doing so, establishes a statutory scheme
that is without rival in the area of disability protection.358
AB 2222 diverges from the ADA in four basic areas. First, AB 2222
broadens the definition of the term "disability" to extend laws
prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations, business
transactions, access to public places, and employment in the state civil
service system. 9 Second, it creates a duty for employers to engage in a
timely, good faith, interactive process to assess potential
accommodations. 360 Third, it prohibits any medical or physical
examinations of either applicants or employees, unless such an
examination is job related and consistent with business necessity.'
Finally, AB 2222 expands statutory protection to individuals against
discrimination on the basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental
disability, potential disability, or one perceived as such. 62
Although each of these areas provides greater protection to individuals
with disabilities, it is the broader definition of disability that will have the
most noticeable impact on litigation in California. AB 2222 expands the
definition of disability in three ways: (1) lowering the threshold of
"limitation" required; (2) explicitly disregarding mitigating measures;
mitigated by measures as ordinary and expedient as wearing eyeglasses, a flood of
litigation will ensue. This suggestion is misguided.").
357. See Commodore Home Sys., Inc. v. Superior Court, 649 P.2d 912, 914 (Cal. 1982)
(noting that the remedies available under the FEHA are broader than those available
under the ADA, including unlimited compensatory damages for pecuniary losses,
damages for emotional distress, and punitive damages).
358. Brad Seligman, Executive Director of Berkeley's Impact Fund, a nonprofit public
interest foundation, stated that "[w]ith the passage of AB 2222, California clearly has the
strongest American with Disabilities law in the country." Joe, supra note 320.
359. AB 2222, §§ 2-4, 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 51, 51.5, 54).
360. Id. § 6(e) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.1(e)); see also supra note 16.
361. AB 2222, § 7(e)(3), 1999-2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2000) (codified at CAL.
Gov'T CODE § 12,940(e)).
362. Id. § 6(b) (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12,926.1(b)).
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and (3) treating working expressly as a major life activity without regard
to the "broad class" or "range of jobs" requirement. The cumulative
effect of these three changes will make it significantly more difficult for
employers being sued to challenge an individual's status as disabled at
the summary judgment phase. 363 The true effect of AB 2222 must not be
gauged until the FEHC issues new regulations and the courts begin to
construe the new statutory framework, but it is likely that there is going
to be an explosion of disability claims brought under the FEHA.
363. In recognizing the import of AB 2222 on the summary judgment phase, in Cripe
v. San Jose, 261 F.3d 877 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit stated:
[A grant of summary] judgment for a defendant as to an ADA claim will not
necessarily lead to a similar judgment with respect to a FEHA claim.
Conversely, however, a defendant who is not entitled to [summary] judgment
with respect to an ADA claim, is a fortiori not entitled to one with respect to a
FEHA claim.
Id. at 895 (emphasis in original); see also Thornton v. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 261
F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2001) (vacating district court's grant of summary judgment on
FEHA claims and remanding in light of section 12,926.1 and expressing no view on the
merits).
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